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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
n 3 December 2008, the European Commission issued a Guidance 
paper setting its enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 to 
abusive exclusionary conduct (hereinafter, ‘the Guidance paper’). 
The Guidance paper will become a key reference for market players, 
judges, competition authorities, practitioners and scholars in the years to 
come. For this reason, it is of utmost importance that its content and overall 
approach are expressed and interpreted in a clear and understandable way.  
In particular, the Guidance paper will be read and interpreted by 
market players as containing indications on the types of conduct that will 
be considered unlawful since they lead to anti-competitive foreclosure, and 
the conditions that will have to be fulfilled for such a conclusion to be 
drawn by the Commission, national courts and competition authorities. In 
our view it is essential that any approach proposed by the Commission for 
any kind of conduct is capable of being applied by a dominant company 
before it decides whether to begin the conduct in question. Accordingly, no 
test or criterion should be proposed or used that depends on information 
that the dominant company could not reasonably be expected to have or be 
able to obtain.  
The CEPS Task Force welcomes the Commission’s efforts to clarify an 
area of competition law that is generally considered to be both unclear and 
unsatisfactory. In particular, we welcome the effort to introduce more 
economic thinking into the legal rules. However, as will be explained in 
this report, we consider that the Guidance paper is unclear or expressed too 
broadly in a number of respects, and that it should be interpreted in certain 
ways to avoid a number of potential difficulties. The CEPS Task Force is 
concerned that, if the recommendations contained in this report are not 
accepted, the Guidance paper will lead to findings of abuse in cases where 
O 
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the findings are not justified either on economic or legal grounds. On the 
other hand, we consider that, if our recommendations are adopted, the law 
would be clearer, companies’ costs of compliance would be reduced, pro-
competitive conduct would not be discouraged and the law would be 
regarded as more reasonable and rational. 
The main recommendations contained in this report are listed below. 
I. Recommendations on the general approach to exclusionary abuses 
1. The definition of dominance  
• Para. 11 of the Guidance paper should either be removed or at least 
amended to specify that a finding of dominance requires significant 
market power, as opposed to an unspecified degree.  
• Given the function of the notion of dominance in an effects-based 
approach to Article 82 EC, we recommend raising the market share 
indicator to 50%, as this threshold is more in line with theory and 
practice than the current 40% indicator identified in para. 14 of the 
Guidance paper.  
• The Commission should acknowledge that, for certain types of abuse, 
an even higher level of market power might be required than under 
the general dominance test.  
• The Commission should develop the section on countervailing buyer 
power in line with the corresponding section of the Guidelines on 
Horizontal Mergers.  
• The Commission should refine its definition of barriers to entry and 
expansion to make it more in line with economic analysis. In 
particular, it is important to clarify that the factors listed in para. 17 of 
the Guidance paper become relevant as barriers to entry or expansion 
only when they lead – individually or in combination with other 
factors – to impeding the possibility of likely, timely and sufficient 
entry.  
2. The theory of harm and the list of generally relevant factors 
• Any case alleging anti-competitive foreclosure must be supported by 
a coherent theory of harm – i.e. an explanation of the anti-competitive 
benefits that the dominant firm might realise if it were able to 
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foreclose competition (incentive); and evidence regarding the 
dominant firm’s ability to foreclose and the likelihood of consumer 
harm. 
• The Commission should clarify that none of the seven factors listed in 
para. 20 can be used in isolation or even together to prove anti-
competitive foreclosure. They should always be included in a 
plausible theory of consumer harm.  
• The Commission should consider introducing rules for a structured 
assessment of the most common practices, able to capture the likely 
consumer harm and the short- and long-term impact on consumers.  
3. Truncated assessments and negative presumptions 
• The circumstances under which the Commission is allowed to avoid 
a full assessment of anti-competitive foreclosure, including 
presumptions of illegality with reversal of burden of proof, should be 
narrowly justified, viewed as strictly exceptional and interpreted 
accordingly.  
4. Protection of ‘not-yet-as-efficient’ competitors 
• Serious concerns are raised by the suggestion in various places in the 
Guidance paper that it may be appropriate for the legality of the 
dominant firm’s pricing conduct to be assessed on the basis of not-
yet-as efficient (cost) standards. The only situation in which a less 
efficient competitor might be protected is when: i) the competitor is 
aggressive, but not yet efficient, and this provokes a reaction from the 
dominant firm; and ii) the conduct of the dominant company is 
specifically aimed at the competitor in question. In that situation, the 
Commission should rely on the principle that prohibits ‘reprisal’ 
abuses, rather than the ‘not-yet-as-efficient’ theory.  
5. Cost benchmarks 
• In order to establish whether equally efficient competitors could be 
foreclosed, the Commission should use two different cost 
benchmarks for price abuses: i) where prices are below AAC, the 
Commission may conclude that the contested practice is capable of 
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foreclosing equally efficient competitors; and ii) where prices are 
between AAC and LRAIC, the Commission should investigate 
whether additional factors point to the conclusion that entry or 
expansion by equally efficient competitors is likely to be affected.  
• However, common costs should be taken into account where: i) they 
are significant relative to total costs; and ii) competitors cannot realise 
similar scope economies by expanding their product range, so as to 
cover common costs through the sale of other products. The 
Commission should accept any cost allocation method for common 
costs employed by a multi-product company, provided that it is: i) 
reasonable and normally accepted (e.g., used by cost accountants, 
economists or regulatory authorities); and ii) is consistently used by 
the dominant firm itself across its different activities (where 
applicable). 
6. Efficiencies 
• In line with the effects-based approach outlined in para. 19 of the 
Guidance paper, the consideration of counterbalancing efficiencies 
should be part of the overall assessment of abuse, rather than left as a 
defence. However, the defendant should have the initial evidential 
burden of alleging the efficiency in question, with the burden 
remaining on a competition authority to show an abuse overall (i.e., 
including consideration of the efficiencies put forward by the 
dominant firm).  
7. Use of economic evidence 
• The Commission should clarify that in some circumstances economic 
evidence may create a prima facie presumption that the conduct was 
unlikely to lead to anti-competitive foreclosure. Such evidence may 
be related, inter alia, to market shares, price levels and product 
quality. Where there is sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie 
presumption of absence of abusive conduct, the conduct should be 
considered as lawful unless the Commission can provide cogent and 
verifiable evidence that the observed improvements (such as price 
reductions, quality increases, etc.) would have occurred on a larger 
scale in the absence of the conduct of the dominant undertaking. 
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II. Recommendations on specific forms of abuse 
8. Single-product rebates 
• The Commission should clarify that: i) it does not mean to suggest 
that conditional rebates on the part of dominant firms should always 
be treated as equivalent to exclusive dealing for competition law 
purposes; and ii) conditional rebates by dominant firms should be 
assessed according to the same effects-based methods that the 
Commission will use to assess other forms of potentially exclusionary 
conduct (e.g. predation).  
• According to the majority of the CEPS Task Force members, the 
Commission should abandon the relevant range concept, and 
probably also the contestable share test. Instead, the Commission 
should state clearly that the net effective price for the threshold 
quantity plus one unit after granting the rebate should be above 
LRAIC. This should entirely replace the discussion of retroactive 
rebates.  
• Other members of the Task Force argued that any analysis of the 
exclusionary effects of conditional rebates should consider the extent 
of the market ‘available’ to rival suppliers without causing customers 
to lose any retroactive rebates that the customers otherwise would 
have received from the dominant supplier. If the ‘available market’ so 
defined is large relative to rivals’ minimum efficient scale, then it is 
less likely that the dominant firm’s rebate scheme can have anti-
competitive foreclosure effects. 
9. Tying  
• The Commission should explain and why the Guidance paper uses a 
different wording for the distinct product test compared to the case 
law and should clarify the intended consequences (if any). 
• The key question for the distinct product test should be whether, in 
the absence of tying or bundling, a substantial number of customers 
would ‘mix and match’ – i.e. purchasing the tying product from the 
dominant firm while purchasing the tied product from a different 
supplier. 
6 | EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
• Further thought should be given to the statement in the Guidance 
paper that, in determining whether the distinct product test is 
satisfied the Commission will consider indirect evidence “such as the 
presence on the market of undertakings specialised in the 
manufacture or sale of the tied product without the tying product”. 
Such evidence may allow the conclusion that products are distinct in 
some circumstances but not in others. 
• The Commission should recognise and confirm that, in applying the 
distinct product test the evidence that ultimately matters is evidence 
which answers the key question set out above, namely whether, 
during the period of the bundling, all but an insubstantial number of 
customers (at the relevant level of trade) still would have purchased 
the tying and tied product from the same supplier (i.e. the dominant 
firm) even if the dominant firm had not engaged in tying or 
bundling.  
• The Commission should clarify that one of the situations in which 
tying and bundling can have anti-competitive effects is when the tied 
product is currently a complement to the tying product, but has the 
potential to evolve into a substitute of the tying product. 
10. Multi-product discount 
• The Commission should clarify that whenever competitors produce 
(or may reasonably produce) more than one bundled product, the 
discount should be allocated to a subset including all the bundled 
products reasonably open to competition, unless it is possible to 
demonstrate that a different allocation is more appropriate. 
Allocation to single bundled products, and/or to smaller subsets of 
the competitive products, may be appropriate only where 
competitors producing only one product, or a smaller subset of the 
competitive products, account for a significant share of the 
competition that the dominant firm faces with respect to these 
products; and when competitors cannot expand their product range 
or engage in other effective forms of bundling counter-strategies, so 
as to offer a subset including all the competitive products.  
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11. Predation and profit sacrifice 
• The Commission should alter the Guidance paper to refer to profit 
sacrifice only as a possible example of the second AKZO rule. It should 
not be suggested that profit sacrifice is a separate test in itself. 
• Furthermore, the Commission should explicitly accept a number of 
defences against allegations of predatory pricing, including cases 
where the dominant firm acted for the purpose of meeting 
competition, engaging in promotional expenditure and loss-leading, 
achieving economies of scale in network industries, large start-up 
investments, or when the firm’s conduct was justified by excess 
capacity during a recession period. 
12. Refusal to contract 
• The Commission should reconcile its treatment of refusal to contract 
with existing case law, and in particular with reference to the 
‘exceptional circumstances’. The Commission should also make sure 
that its assessment of refusal to contract remains within the 
boundaries of the ‘anticompetitive foreclosure’ test that inspires the 
whole Guidance paper. The Commission should clarify under what 
conditions the dominant firm will be able to avoid continuation of 
previous supply. 
• The Guidance paper should contain a clearer statement on the fact 
that only competition by innovation, not competition by imitation, is 
to be pursued by imposing a duty to contract when the relevant 
exceptional circumstances are met.  
• The Guidance paper should state that the treatment of refusals to 
contract requires an assessment of the long-term impacts of imposing 
a duty to contract on all players’ incentives to invest and innovate, as 
well as consumer welfare. Useful criteria can be identified and 
included in the Guidance, which would add clarity for market 
players and lead to more easily understandable and applicable rules.  
• The Commission should clarify under what (exceptional) 
circumstances it will protect follow-on innovation by competitors, 
and why. 
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13. Margin squeeze 
• A finding of margin squeeze should always require evidence of 
actual or likely anti-competitive effects, i.e. harm to consumer welfare 
in the sense defined in this Report.  
• The Commission should be extremely careful before finding a margin 
squeeze abuse when: i) the dominant firm’s wholesale input costs are 
a small part of rivals’ overall costs; ii) the dominant firm‘s wholesale 
input is used in variable proportions by rivals; or iii) rivals use the 
input to provide a range of services (whether or not the dominant 
firm itself also offers competing services). In these cases, it will 
usually be far from obvious that a margin squeeze is occurring or that 
if it is, it has more than de minimis effects. 
• Margin squeeze imputation tests should normally be based on the 
dominant firm’s own costs. However, in cases such as those 
identified in the previous bullet point, the Commission should also 
consider whether the dominant firm priced below its rivals’ actual 
costs before finding an abuse. 
• Start-up phases in markets raise significant complexities in margin 
squeeze cases. The mere fact of the dominant firm’s having losses or 
its failure to pass an as-efficient competitor test should not be 
sufficient in itself for a finding of abuse. In such cases, the 
Commission should explain that i) relying on historical costs only 
will generally be inappropriate; ii) it may make sense to exclude a 
short start-up phase from the analysis entirely; iii) loss minimisation 
is an acceptable strategy for a dominant firm in a start-up phase; and 
iv) failure by the dominant firm to take remedial action once it 
became apparent that it would not meet the targets would constitute 
abusive conduct (assuming the other conditions are met). 
• Margin squeeze often emerges in regulated markets. In this respect, 
the Commission should reiterate the fundamental principle that 
national regulatory authorities (NRAs) should not approve or even 
encourage measures that are contrary to Article 82 EC; and that in 
general, if a NRA misapplies Community law, the remedy is an 
infringement action against the Member State, not a competition 
investigation by the Commission.  
• The Commission should in general only intervene in cases where 
there is parallel ex ante regulation if: i) the regulatory authority lacks 
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the requisite legal basis or enforcement powers to take effective 
action; or ii) if there is a ‘lazy’ or ‘captured’ regulator unwilling or 
unable to apply its own rules. (The Commission could not formally 
declare that a regulator was lazy or captured, but that would be the 
clear implication.) In general, in cases where there is parallel ex ante 
regulation by an NRA, it is better to allow the NRA to implement any 
remedies since it will be closer to the facts and be better able to 
conduct the detailed monitoring usually required in regulatory cases. 
III. Additional recommendations 
14. Discrimination 
• A section on discrimination should be added in the next revision of 
the Guidance paper to ensure that the Commission’s views on Article 
82(c) and those contained in the Guidance paper are consistent. 
• In that section, the Commission should state that, in most cases, price 
rebates and other differential prices that are non-exclusionary are also 
legal under Article 82(c). It should also say that if a rebate is equally 
available to all buyers, the fact that only some will qualify for it does 
not make it illegal. In general, different treatment that is neither 
exploitative nor exclusionary is legal (unless it is a reprisal). 
• The Commission should also make it clear that even though the price 
level may sometimes be determined by marginal buyers, it is not 
necessarily illegal to price-discriminate between marginal and infra-
marginal buyers, and so deprive the latter of some of the benefit of 
competition. 
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INTRODUCTION 
n 3 December 2008, the European Commission issued a Guidance 
paper setting its enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 to 
abusive exclusionary conduct (hereinafter the Guidance paper).1 
The document had been expected for a long time, especially after the 
Discussion paper published by the Commission in December 2005, which 
paved the way towards a more economic approach to the application of 
Article 82 of the EU Treaty to exclusionary abuses.2 The new Guidance 
paper seeks to streamline the antitrust treatment of exclusionary abuses, 
such as exclusive dealing, refusals to supply, tying, single-product and 
bundled rebates and predation, by adopting a general concept of ‘anti-
competitive foreclosure’, which contains both the elements of actual 
foreclosure and consumer harm.  
This report comments on the Guidance paper and issues 
recommendations aimed at improving the Commission’s text and the 
interpretation of some of the rules contained therein. Even if the 
Commission does not issue a revised version of the Guidance paper, it is 
hoped that the comments in this report will be useful to the Commission in 
                                                     
1  After having undergone legal-linguistic revision, the “Guidance on the 
Commission’s enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to 
abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings”, was adopted in all 
EU languages on 9 February 2009. See OJ No. C.45/7, February 24, 2009. The 
document is also available online, at the following website: 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/art82/index.html.  
2  The “Discussion paper on the application of Article 82 of the Treaty to 
exclusionary abuses”, published in December 2005, is available online at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/art82/discpaper2005.pdf.  
O 
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its application of the principles set out in the Guidance paper and to 
national courts in their interpretation of the Guidance paper. 
The report is the result of a joint effort of academics, practitioners and 
industry representatives coordinated by the Centre for European Policy 
Studies and chaired by Dr. John Temple Lang. The group, called the CEPS 
Task Force on the treatment of exclusionary abuses under Article 82 (CEPS 
Task Force, for short) met five times in Brussels between February and June 
2009, to discuss the Commission’s Guidance paper, and also continued the 
debate on an ad hoc online forum created by CEPS.3 The views expressed in 
this report have been agreed by a consensus of the Task Force participants, 
but do not necessarily represent the views of each participant. As will be 
seen at various places, there was disagreement between participants on a 
number of issues. 
The CEPS Task Force believes that the Guidance paper will become a 
key reference for market players, judges, competition authorities, 
practitioners and scholars in the years to come. For this reason, it is of 
utmost importance that its content and overall approach are expressed and 
interpreted in a clear and understandable way.  
In particular, although the Guidance paper is conceived as setting the 
enforcement priorities of the Commission, it will de facto be considered by 
national courts and competition authorities as a document containing 
guidelines on how to apply Article 82 to exclusionary abuses in the years to 
come.4 Accordingly, the approach adopted by the Commission should be 
stated in such a way that judges and competition authorities can apply it as 
easily as possible, and diverging interpretations throughout the EU27 are 
kept at a minimum. The Commission should also be mindful in this regard 
of the distinction between administrative enforcement and private 
                                                     
3  See Annex I at the end of this report for a list of the Task Force participants. 
4  In the Guidance paper the Commission specifies that the “document sets out 
the enforcement priorities that will guide the Commission’s action in applying 
Article 82 to exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings ... it is intended to 
provide greater clarity and predictability as regards the general framework of 
analysis which the Commission employs in determining whether it should 
pursue cases concerning various forms of exclusionary conduct and to help 
undertakings better assess whether certain behaviour is likely to result in 
intervention by the Commission under Article 82”. See Guidance paper, § 2. 
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litigation. In particular, while a regulatory body may be entitled to set 
enforcement priorities (e.g. to protect not-yet-as-efficient competitors in 
certain circumstances), a national court or arbitral body in general has no 
such discretion.  
Moreover, the Guidance paper will be read and interpreted by 
market players as containing indications on the types of conduct that will 
be considered unlawful since they lead to anti-competitive foreclosure, and 
the conditions that will have to be fulfilled for such a conclusion to be 
drawn by the Commission, national courts and competition authorities. In 
our view it is essential that any approach proposed by the Commission for 
any kind of conduct is capable of being applied by a dominant company 
before it decides whether to begin the conduct in question. This approach 
was endorsed also by the Court of First Instance in its Deutsche Telekom 
decision.5 Accordingly, no test or criterion should be proposed or used, 
which depends on information that the dominant company could not 
reasonably be expected to have or to be able to obtain. This is a necessary 
consequence of the principle of legal certainty and of the fact that the 
European Union is subject to the rule of law. It is also an obvious practical 
necessity, since the Community is obliged to rely primarily on voluntary 
compliance by dominant companies. No company can be expected to obey 
the law, or to regard the law as reasonable, if it is compelled to decide its 
conduct on the basis of information that it cannot be expected to have. This 
is even more obvious when it is remembered that if a dominant company 
was expected to know information about its rivals’ competitively sensitive 
business in order to decide whether its conduct was lawful, any effort that 
it made to find out would be clearly contrary to Article 81.  
Based on these considerations, the CEPS Task Force analysed and 
discussed in detail the content and potential impact of the Commission’s 
Guidance paper, with a view to producing constructive comments.  
                                                     
5  See Case T-271/03. At §192, the CFI states: “If the lawfulness of the pricing 
practices of a dominant undertaking depended on the particular situation of 
competing undertakings, particularly their cost structure – information which is 
generally not known to the dominant undertaking – the latter would not be in a 
position to assess the lawfulness of its own activities”: The CFI also clarifies, in 
the same para., that “any other approach could be contrary to the general 
principle of legal certainty”. 
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• Overall, the CEPS Task Force welcomes the Commission’s efforts to 
clarify an area of competition law that is generally considered to be 
both unclear and unsatisfactory. In particular, we welcome the effort 
to introduce more economic thinking into the legal rules. However, 
as will be explained in the next sections, we consider that in a number 
of respects the Guidance paper is unclear or expressed too broadly, 
and that it should be interpreted in certain ways, set out in the next 
sections, to avoid a number of potential difficulties. 
• While the Guidance paper states that the Commission’s focus will be 
on anti-competitive foreclosure and that the Commission recognises 
that “what really matters is protecting an effective competitive 
process and not simply protecting competitors”,6 the Guidance paper 
does not always give enough weight to the need to prove consumer 
harm as a precondition to any finding of abuse. The Commission is 
right to distinguish between anti-competitive foreclosure and 
legitimate foreclosure: however, the distinction is not made clearly 
enough, and is not applied consistently and clearly throughout the 
Guidance paper. 
• The Commission seems to have described its future approach to some 
types of conduct with implicit reference to a number of recent (or 
pending) cases. While it is perfectly understandable that the 
Commission describes its future approach and enforcement priorities 
on the basis of its previous experience and decisions, we are 
concerned that some sections of the Guidance paper could be read as 
an effort by the Commission to use the Guidance paper to supply 
authority that the Commission may have felt was missing when it 
reached certain recent decisions. 
We are concerned that, if the recommendations contained in this 
report are not accepted, the Guidance paper will lead to findings of abuse 
in cases where the findings are not justified either in economics or in law. 
This leads to legal uncertainty and might discourage pro-competitive 
behaviour, so that the widespread and serious disadvantages would 
greatly outweigh whatever benefits the Commission might hope to obtain. 
On the other hand, we consider that, if our recommendations are adopted, 
the law would be much clearer, companies’ costs of compliance would be 
                                                     
6  See Guidance paper, para. 6. 
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greatly reduced, pro-competitive conduct would not be discouraged, and 
the law would be regarded as reasonable and rational.  
This report is structured in three main parts. Part 1 contains our 
assessment of the Commission’s general approach to exclusionary conduct 
and comments in particular on the definition and treatment of dominance 
and market power, the definition of anti-competitive foreclosure and the 
treatment of consumer harm. We also comment more specifically on the 
merits of protecting ‘not-yet-as-efficient’ competitors, the use of cost 
benchmarks, the definition of barriers to entry and expansion, the role of 
efficiency defences and the related problem of truncated analysis, negative 
presumptions and, more generally, the standard of proof in Article 82 
cases. Finally, we provide suggestions on the use of economic evidence in 
dealing with Article 82 cases, especially when some or all of the likely 
effects of the alleged exclusionary conduct are supposed to have already 
materialised when the case is decided. Part 2 deals with specific forms of 
exclusionary conduct as defined in the Guidance paper, and thus 
comments on the Commission’s approach regarding exclusive dealing, 
single-product and bundled rebates, tying, predation, refusal to deal and 
margin squeeze. Part 3 concludes by providing comments on the need to 
complete the current Guidance paper by adding a section on 
discrimination.  
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1. THE GENERAL APPROACH TO 
EXCLUSIONARY ABUSES 
n important feature of the Guidance paper is the identification of a 
general approach to be applied to all types of exclusionary 
conduct.7 This test leads to challenging a given conduct when the 
undertaking holds a dominant position in the relevant market and the 
conduct at hand, “on the basis of cogent and convincing evidence”, is likely 
to lead to anti-competitive foreclosure of rivals8. More precisely, identifying 
an exclusionary abuse requires a finding that the observed conduct led to 
(or is likely to lead to):  
• Foreclosure of ‘as efficient competitors’ or – under specific 
circumstances – ‘not yet as efficient competitors’.9 
• An adverse impact on consumer welfare, “whether in the form of 
higher price levels than would have otherwise prevailed or in some 
other form such as limiting quality or reducing consumer choice”.10 
In this respect, the Commission clarifies that the main goal of the 
application of Article 82 to exclusionary abuses is indeed the protection of 
consumers, rather than competitors.11 Moreover, in the Guidance paper the 
                                                     
7  Section III of the Guidance paper. 
8  Ibid., para. 20. 
9  See below, section 1.2.4. 
10  See Guidance paper, para. 19. 
11  Ibid., para. 6, stating: “the Commission is mindful that what really matters is 
protecting an effective competitive process and not simply protecting 
competitors. This may well mean that competitors who deliver less to 
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Commission identifies a number of factors that might be considered 
relevant in the assessment of dominance;12 and also factors that may be 
taken into consideration in assessing the likelihood that an observed 
conduct by a dominant undertaking is likely to lead to anti-competitive 
foreclosure.13 
The Commission puts emphasis on a more sound economic approach 
to exclusionary abuses. However, the Guidance paper also states that 
“[t]here may be circumstances where it is not necessary for the Commission 
to carry out a detailed assessment before concluding that the conduct in 
question is likely to result in consumer harm”, and that “[i]f it appears that 
the conduct can only raise obstacles to competition and that it creates no 
efficiencies, its anti-competitive effect may be inferred”.14 While, in a 
narrow set of circumstances, the Commission may find that the facts of the 
case unequivocally indicate the existence of an infringing conduct even 
without the need for a full analysis of the effects, we believe that the 
conditions that have to be met for a truncated assessment to become viable 
have to be very precisely defined. Otherwise, the standard of proof for a 
finding of abuse may vary unpredictably. In the next sections, we suggest 
that the standard of proof envisaged in the Guidance paper is not 
consistent. 
More generally, the concepts of dominance and market power, the 
theory of harm relevant to the definition of abuse of dominance, the factors 
relevant to the finding of anti-competitive foreclosure, as well as the 
                                                                                                                                       
consumers in terms of price, choice, quality and innovation will leave the 
market”. 
12  Ibid., para. 12. These factors include: i) the market position of the dominant 
undertaking and its competitors, ii) constraints imposed by the credible threat 
of future expansion by actual competitors or entry by potential competitors and 
iii) constraints imposed by the bargaining strength of the undertaking’s 
customers (countervailing buyer power). 
13  Ibid., para. 20. These factors include: i) the position of the dominant 
undertaking, ii) the conditions on the relevant market, iii) the position of the 
dominant undertaking’s competitors, iv) the position of the customers or input 
suppliers, v) the extent of the allegedly abusive conduct, vi) possible evidence 
of actual foreclosure and vii) direct evidence of any exclusionary strategy. 
14  Ibid., para. 22. 
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standard of proof and the role and scope of truncated analysis will play a 
decisive role for a sound treatment of exclusionary abuses. Accordingly, it 
is of utmost importance that these concepts are clearly identified and 
consistently interpreted throughout the Guidance paper. In the next 
sections, we provide an analysis of the Commission’s general approach to 
exclusionary conduct and provide comments and recommendations for a 
future revision of the Guidance paper.  
1.1 Market power and dominance  
In the Guidance paper (para. 10), the Commission starts from the classic 
definition of dominance found in ECJ case law since United Brands and 
Hoffman-Laroche, whereby a dominant position is “a position of economic 
strength enjoyed by an undertaking which enables it to prevent effective 
competition being maintained on the relevant market by giving it the 
power to behave to an appreciable extent independently of its competitors, 
customers and ultimately of its consumers”.15 In the latter case, the ECJ 
expanded on its test by adding that “such a position does not preclude 
some competition... but enables the undertaking which profits by it, if not 
to determine, at least to have an appreciable influence on the conditions 
under which that competition will develop, and in any case to act largely in 
disregard of it so long as such conduct does not operate to its detriment”.16 
One of the key difficulties with the concept of dominance under 
Article 82 EC is that it works in an either-or fashion – a firm is either 
dominant or it is not – whereas the underlying economic notion – market 
power – works on a sliding scale.17 A firm can have more or less market 
power: almost all firms hold some measure of market power, while a 
smaller set of firms hold significant market power. In fact, firms typically 
gain some market power through product differentiation, thereby enabling 
                                                     
15  Chiquita, OJ 1976 L95/1, confirmed on appeal in case 27/76, United Brands 
Company and United Brands Continental BV v. Commission [1978] ECR 207, para. 
65.  
16  See Vitamins, OJ 1976 L223/27, confirmed on appeal in case 85/76, Hoffmann-La 
Roche & Co AG v. Commission [1979] ECR461, para. 39. 
17  See, e.g. R. O’Donoghue and A.J. Padilla, The Law and Economics of Article 82 EC, 
Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2006, Chapter 3. 
18 | THE GENERAL APPROACH TO EXCLUSIONARY ABUSES 
 
them to generate a modest rent.18 The challenge is to find the appropriate 
point on the sliding scale where a firm can be said to hold enough market 
power to warrant a finding of dominance and consequently make the firm 
fall under the scope of application of Article 82 EC. In line with basic 
principles of law, that point should be set high enough to avoid undue 
intervention. It is apparent from the excerpts above that the ECJ was aware 
of that problem, and that it had in mind a significant level of market power 
where the firm could discipline competitors and thereby affect competition 
on the market. 
This is why, when the Commission writes in para. 11 of the Guidance 
paper that it “considers that an undertaking which is capable of profitably 
increasing prices above the competitive level for a significant period of time 
does not face sufficiently effective competitive constraints and can thus 
generally be regarded as dominant”, it is setting the bar much too low, at 
least as far as exclusionary abuses are concerned.19 Indeed, many markets 
are characterised by a certain amount of product differentiation, which 
gives firms the ability to extract some rent from the market, however 
modest. In addition, it is very difficult in practice to ascertain correctly 
where the competitive price level lies. As a consequence, the interpretation 
set out in para. 11 carries a risk of unwarranted findings of dominance 
(and, if anti-competitive foreclosure is also alleged, of Type I-errors in the 
enforcement of Article 82 EC). 
As already recalled, with the Guidance paper the Commission 
intends to move towards a more effects-based understanding of Article 82 
EC. This implies that more structural analytical elements typically found in 
the assessment of dominance resurface in the assessment of abuse as well: 
                                                     
18  See, i.a., R. Posner, Antitrust Law, 2nd Ed., Chicago, Il: University of Chicago 
Press, 2001, p. 265; D.W. Carlton and J.M. Perloff, Modern Industrial 
Organization, Scott, Foresman/Little, Brown 1989, p. 738; and M. Motta, 
Competition Policy – Theory and Practice, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2004, pp. 115-116. Only in the theoretical model of perfect competition or 
in the Bertrand model with homogeneous products would firms enjoy no 
market power. 
19  Note that while this excerpt might correspond to the definition of ‘market 
power’ under US antitrust law, under § 2 of the Sherman Act substantial market 
power is required in order to find that a firm has ‘monopoly power’. 
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since the abuse is defined by reference to its effects,20 structural elements 
are relevant in establishing whether the course of conduct will lead to anti-
competitive foreclosure. That much is clear from the list of relevant 
elements set out in para. 20 of the Guidance paper.21 Accordingly, if – and 
only if – the abuse assessment is carried out correctly, it is very likely that a 
significant level of market power will be required in order to support a 
finding that a course of conduct leads to anti-competitive foreclosure. 
Against this background, the notion of dominance is best seen as a 
screen or a safe harbour: only above the dominance threshold is the 
likelihood of anti-competitive foreclosure high enough to warrant a more 
in-depth inquiry into the course of conduct pursued by a firm. This is why 
the low threshold set out in para. 11 is not consistent with the thrust of the 
Guidance paper. This is true, in particular, as regards the setting of the 
market share indicator to 40% (in para. 14). 
In light of the above, that 40% figure also appears on the low side. It 
seems to us that it would be more consistent with both theory and practice 
to put at 50% the level of market share below which there is a rebuttable 
presumption that a firm holds no dominant position. In theory, if half or 
more of the relevant market is in the hands of competitors and generally 
contestable, it is difficult to see how the dominant firm could hold such 
significant market power as to be able to discipline competition without 
consequences for itself. In practice, in most cases under Article 82 EC so far, 
firms found dominant had a market share above 50% (and usually well 
above 50%); this corresponds also to the findings of the survey carried out 
by the US Department of Justice regarding the application of § 2 of the 
Sherman Act.22 By creating a rebuttable presumption to this effect, the 
Commission would, more often than not, avoid excessive caution by firms 
                                                     
20  For an analysis of the concept of anti-competitive foreclosure, see Section 1.2.1 
below. 
21  See Section 1.4 below. 
22  US Department of Justice, Competition and Monopoly: Single-Firm Conduct under 
Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 2008, pp. 21-24. Even if that report has been 
withdrawn, the reasons for withdrawing it have more to do with the approach 
to the assessment of unilateral conduct than with the analysis of monopoly 
power. 
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that are probably not dominant, while it would retain the full discretion to 
intervene in individual cases above or below the 50% threshold. 
What is more, with the move to a more effects-based approach to 
abuse, the Commission must be more careful to calibrate the levels of 
dominance so that the degree of market power offers a probability of harm. 
The Commission already does this in the case of certain abuses, most 
notably refusal to supply. In a number of cases including Commercial 
Solvents, RTE and ITV v Commission, Oscar Bronner and Microsoft, the finding 
of dominance has moved beyond a general test to one of de facto monopoly 
and indispensable input into a second market. In such cases, the degree of 
dominance required for a finding of abuse is so high that it could be 
viewed virtually as a constituent element of the concept of abuse. Certainly, 
the Court of First Instance made it clear in the Microsoft case that the degree 
of dominance was itself a major factor in confirming a finding of abuse. 
What is now needed is a greater degree of care by the Commission to 
bring cases in which the degree of dominance is more closely related to the 
type of abuse. Instead of an unrelated two-step test dominance/abuse, 
there should be more care at the dominance stage of investigation to ensure 
that the degree of market power is such that the abusive conduct might 
potentially lead to actual harm. 
What is also needed is a more explicit recognition in its Guidance 
paper in paras. 9-11 of the way its approach to definition of market power 
and dominance will vary depending upon the nature of the alleged abuse; 
certain types of abuse require an even greater level of market power than 
the standard dominance test. 
 
Recommendations 
• Para. 11 should either be removed from the Guidance paper, or at 
least amended to specify that a finding of dominance requires 
significant market power as defined in para. 11, as opposed to an 
unspecified degree thereof.  
• Given the function of the notion of dominance in an effects-based 
approach to Article 82 EC, we also recommend raising the market 
share indicator to 50%, as this threshold is more in line with theory 
and practice than the current 40% indicator identified in para. 14 of 
the Guidance paper.  
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• The Commission should acknowledge that, for certain types of abuse, 
an even higher level of market power might be required than under 
the general dominance test.  
 
1.1.1 Barriers to expansion and entry and countervailing buyer power  
In para. 12 of the Guidance paper, the Commission correctly identified i) 
the market position of the dominant firm and its competitors, ii) barriers to 
expansion and entry and iii) countervailing buyer power as the three main 
factors in the assessment of dominance. In this sub-section, we look more 
closely at the latter two factors.  
• With respect to countervailing buyer power, para. 18of the Guidance 
paper seems to follow the same line of analysis as the Horizontal 
Merger Guidelines [2004] OJ C 31/5, paras. 64-67. However, the 
Guidelines are more detailed than the Guidance paper on this point: 
accordingly, we recommend that the statements made in the 
Guidance paper be further developed along the lines of the 
Guidelines.  
• Given that countervailing buyer power (point iii above) will not be 
present in many cases, for all intents and purposes, the main if not 
the only hope for an undertaking to avoid a finding of dominance 
based on an examination of market shares (point i above) is to argue 
that the barriers to expansion and entry on the relevant market are 
low and that it is therefore subject to competitive pressure from 
potential entrants or smaller competitors (point ii above). 
Against this background, the Commission defines barriers to 
expansion and entry in a very broad manner. According to para. 17 of the 
Guidance paper, such barriers include “advantages specifically enjoyed by 
the dominant undertaking, such as economies of scale and scope, 
privileged access to essential inputs or natural resources, important 
technologies or an established distribution and sales network. They may 
also include costs and other impediments, for instance resulting from 
network effects, faced by customers in switching to a new supplier. The 
dominant undertaking’s own conduct may also create barriers to entry, for 
example where it has made significant investments which entrants or 
competitors would have to match, or where it has concluded long-term 
contracts with its customers that have appreciable foreclosing effects” 
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(footnotes omitted). To complete the picture, it is added that “persistently 
high market shares may be indicative of the existence of barriers to entry 
and expansion”, thereby opening the door to a prompt dismissal of 
arguments relating to such barriers.  
On the basis of the broad definition given by the Commission, there 
will always be some feature of the relevant market or of the defendant firm 
that qualifies as a barrier to entry. Accordingly, the prospects for arguing 
successfully that a large market share is counter-balanced by the absence of 
barriers to entry and expansion are bleak, to say the least.  
In our view, it would be useful if the Commission would bring the 
Guidance paper into line with the economic literature in order to have a 
more correct definition of barriers to entry and expansion.23 Time plays a 
central role in this more recent literature, as reflected also in the Horizontal 
Merger Guidelines. Accordingly, if the dominant firm enjoys advantages 
that do not as such delay entry, then they should not constitute barriers to 
entry for the purposes of Article 82 EC. Para. 16 of the Guidance paper 
already specifies that the Commission considers barriers to expansion and 
entry to be relevant only whenever they impede expansion or entry that is 
i) likely, ii) timely and iii) sufficient (i.e. not simply small-scale). It seems, 
from the wording of this paragraph, that the Commission considers these 
three conditions as cumulative – for expansion or entry to be considered as 
exerting pressure on the putatively dominant firm, all three conditions 
have to be met.  
The Commission should thus clarify that the factors listed in para. 17 
of the Guidance paper become relevant as barriers to entry or expansion 
only when they lead – individually or in combination with other factors – 
to impeding the possibility of likely, timely and sufficient entry. The 
                                                     
23  Leaving aside the very broad view put forward by Bain (1956) – who came up 
with the concept of barrier to entry – and the very narrow view put forward by 
Stigler (1968), recent literature (McAfee et al., 2004) advocates a more balanced 
definition, whereby a “barrier to entry is a cost that delays entry and thereby 
reduces social welfare relative to immediate but equally costly entry”. See J.S. 
Bain, Barriers to New Competition, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1956; G. Stigler, The Organization of Industry, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago 
Press, 1968 and R.P. McAfee, H. Mialon and M. Williams, “What Is a Barrier to 
Entry?”, 94, American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, 2004, p. 461. 
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Commission should also explain in more detail what is meant by likely, 
timely and sufficient. 
 
Recommendations 
• The Commission should develop the section on countervailing buyer 
power in line with the corresponding section of the Guidelines on 
Horizontal Mergers. 
• The Commission should thus clarify that the factors listed in para. 17 
of the Guidance paper become relevant as barriers to entry or 
expansion only when they lead – individually or in combination with 
other factors – to impeding the possibility of likely, timely and 
sufficient entry. The Commission should also explain in more detail 
what is meant by likely, timely and sufficient. 
1.2 The theory of harm and the definition of abuse 
The Guidance paper recognises that the aim of enforcement activity with 
respect to exclusionary conduct is to promote and protect consumer 
welfare and that it would be inappropriate to determine whether conduct is 
abusive based simply on the effect of the conduct on competitors. The 
Guidance paper recognises that “competitors who deliver less to 
consumers in terms of price, choice, quality and innovation will leave the 
market” (para. 6) – and the Guidance paper regards such departures from 
the market as the natural and appropriate consequence of “an effective 
competitive process” (ibid.). 
Aware that its objective should be to protect consumers and 
consumer welfare rather than protecting competitors, the Commission 
explains in the Guidance paper that it aims to focus its enforcement efforts 
in the area of exclusionary conduct on ‘anti-competitive foreclosure’ (as 
opposed to foreclosure per se). The Commission defines anti-competitive 
foreclosure as a situation where: a) the conduct of the dominant company 
hampers or eliminates effective access of actual or potential competitors to 
supplies or markets and b) is likely to have an adverse impact on consumer 
welfare, whether in the form of higher price levels than would have 
otherwise prevailed or in some other form (para. 19). Both conditions are 
meant to be necessary for an exclusionary abuse: foreclosure and likely 
consumer harm, i.e. the likelihood that as a consequence of the conduct the 
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dominant company will be in a position to profitably affect the parameters 
of competition – such as prices, output, innovation, the variety and quality 
of goods or services – to the detriment of consumers. 
Paras. 20-22 of the Guidance paper elaborate on how the Commission 
will attempt to determine whether conduct that makes life difficult for 
competitors should be regarded as the workings of an effective competitive 
process or instead anti-competitive foreclosure. The general discussion in 
this section of the Guidance paper is meant to be read with the discussion 
of specific forms of abuse in section IV of the paper.  
There are three main problems with this section of the Guidance 
paper: 
• Any anti-competitive foreclosure theory should be supported in the first 
instance by a coherent theory of harm. More precisely, any theory of anti-
competitive foreclosure must be supported by a careful consideration 
of both the incentive and ability of the dominant firm to foreclose 
competition. This need to explain the dominant firm’s incentive as 
well as its ability to foreclose is especially important in cases of 
alleged vertical foreclosure. The Commission makes this point in its 
Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines. The same point should be 
emphasised in this Guidance paper on exclusionary conduct 
enforcement priorities.  
• The Guidance paper presents in para. 20 a list of factors that the 
Commission will consider when assessing the likelihood that specific 
conduct will have anti-competitive effects. This is a critical step in the 
analysis. The Guidance paper however provides insufficient guidance as to 
how these factors will be considered and weighed. This absence of 
specificity denies dominant firms the element of predictability to 
which they are entitled. 
• Para. 22 states that there may be situations in which the conduct in 
question “can only raise obstacles to competition” and “creates no 
efficiencies”. The Guidance paper states that, in such circumstances, it 
is not necessary for the Commission to carry out a detailed 
assessment of the conduct before reaching the conclusion that the 
conduct is likely to result in consumer harm. We submit that such 
situations are so rare that any benefit that might result from having 
the option of conducting a truncated analysis in these rare cases is 
outweighed by the risk that the Commission might mistakenly use a 
truncated analysis in a situation in which a fuller analysis of the 
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effects on consumer welfare is warranted. Especially in a paper that is 
meant to summarise enforcement priorities, we suggest the Commission and 
other users of the Guidance paper ignore para. 22 and instead demand, in all 
cases, evidence regarding the likely effects on consumers.  
 
Recommendations 
• The Commission must ensure that any case alleging anti-competitive 
foreclosure is supported by a coherent theory of harm – i.e. an 
explanation of the anti-competitive benefits that the dominant firm 
might realise if it were able to foreclose competition (incentive). 
• As discussed below, the Commission should ensure that cases of 
alleged anti-competitive foreclosure are also supported by empirical 
evidence regarding the dominant firm’s ability to foreclose and the 
likelihood of consumer harm. 
 
1.2.1 The list of generally relevant factors 
As just discussed, it is not sufficient for the Commission to present a 
coherent theory of harm, i.e. an explanation of the dominant firm’s anti-
competitive incentives to foreclose. The Commission must also support 
cases of alleged anti-competitive foreclosure with empirical evidence 
regarding the dominant firm’s ability to foreclose and the likelihood of 
consumer harm. In para. 20 of the Guidance paper, the Commission lists 
and discusses factors that it will consider in making this assessment. 
The Commission identifies seven factors that it considers generally 
relevant to the assessment of anti-competitive foreclosure: the position of 
the dominant undertaking, the conditions on the relevant market which 
may affect the impact of foreclosure, the competitive importance of 
foreclosed competitors, the competitive importance of the customers or 
input suppliers, the extent of the allegedly abusive conduct (market share 
affected by the conduct, duration, etc.), evidence of actual foreclosure and 
direct evidence of any exclusionary strategy (para. 20). This list of generally 
relevant elements in the assessment of abuse is aimed at providing 
examples of evidence that can be used to prove an anti-competitive 
foreclosure; however, it lacks the sharpness that would be expected in the 
light of para. 19.  
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First, it bears noting that some of the factors listed in para. 19 seem 
more relevant for the assessment of dominance than for the assessment of 
the allegedly anti-competitive conduct. In particular:  
• The first, second and fifth factors on the list are mainly structural. If taken 
in isolation, to the exclusion of other elements, they would reflect an 
outdated Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) paradigm and entail 
a risk that any course of conduct by a dominant company would be 
an abuse.24 
• The last two factors in the list may be particularly misleading. Direct 
evidence of foreclosure is consistent with anti-competitive 
foreclosure, but it can never be considered as sufficient proof of anti-
competitive foreclosure. Firms may leave the market because the 
dominant firm outperformed them through business acumen or 
superior products. Inefficient competitors are then ‘harmed’, but 
consumers benefit. The risk of spurious correlations should thus not 
be underestimated.  
As regards the direct evidence of an exclusionary strategy, in para. 20 the 
Commission specifies that it will not be used as direct proof of the abuse, 
but only as an instrument that may be helpful to ‘interpret’ the conduct of 
the dominant firm. Here it is very important to distinguish between mere 
sales talk – however outrageous and colourful – and concrete evidence of a 
well thought-out plan to eliminate rivals. The latter can be useful, as an 
element to explain the theory of harm (i.e. the dominant firm’s incentive to 
foreclose) and establish its plausibility. The Commission must be careful, 
however, not to fall into the trap of treating the former type of evidence – 
sales talk – as crucial, and deriving a finding of abuse based on informal 
statements by salesmen without involvement in company policy. Intent is 
relevant only in a limited number of cases (e.g. predation when prices are 
                                                     
24 The SCP paradigm was the dominant framework for empirical research in 
industrial organisation (IO) between the 1950s and early 1980s. The paradigm 
postulates a causality chain running from market structure, firms’ conduct and 
their performance. The influence of the paradigm only began to wane in the 
1980s with the emergence of new approaches such as the New Industrial 
Organisation. The origin of the SCP paradigm can be traced to the work of the 
Harvard economist Edward Mason in the 1930s, and in Joe S. Bain’s book 
entitled Barriers to New Competition, op. cit. 
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between average avoidable cost and average total cost, vexatious litigation, 
reprisals).  
However, the first five elements in the list may play a useful role as 
screening devices, which can be used to exclude the risk of anti-competitive 
foreclosure. For instance, in cases of alleged predation, the absence of 
barriers to entry may be used to exclude the likelihood of recoupment.25 
More generally, for pricing conduct a small percentage of the total sales in 
the relevant market affected by the dominant firm‘s discount policy and its 
short duration may be useful to exclude the likelihood of an anti-
competitive story and is therefore an important complement to the 
assessment of whether the price is below some cost indicator. 
The fourth and fifth elements – consideration of the position of 
competitors and customers/suppliers – are particularly important from an 
effects-based perspective. Indeed, the competitive process must be 
understood as a complex interaction between market players: each player is 
aware of the position of the others and tries to anticipate their reaction as it 
makes its own moves. Structure and behaviour are closely intertwined. 
Only if the position of others is properly factored in can the competition 
authority differentiate between desirable aggressive competition and 
conduct that can genuinely foreclose efficient rivals.  
Overall, the factors listed in para. 20 can be relevant to establish 
whether a given course of conduct is likely to foreclose rivals, but are less 
apt to reveal whether that foreclosure is detrimental to consumer welfare. 
Indeed, what is still blurred in the discussion in paras. 20-21 is the crucial 
last step in the assessment of abuse under an effects-based approach, 
namely the actual or likely impact on consumer welfare. In this respect, it 
would be useful if the Guidance paper could contain the following: 
• A clearer identification of criteria for a structured assessment of the most 
common practices, able to capture the likely consumer harm. In particular, 
absent evidence of actual consumer harm, a consistent story supported 
by evidence should always be provided showing that in the specific case 
under consideration consumer harm is likely. In doing this, the 
Commission should also clearly spell out the short- and long-term 
impact on consumers.  
                                                     
25  See section 2.4 below. 
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• An explanation of how these different factors will be weighed in the assessment 
of most common practices, which would prove helpful for potentially 
dominant firms in assessing whether their conduct is likely to be 
considered abusive or not. 
• A statement clarifying that the Commission should provide evidence that the 
chosen theory of anti-competitive foreclosure applies to the specific 
circumstances of the case. It is not sufficient to state that a generic theory 
could apply to a similar conduct in some circumstances. Importantly, as 
required by Community courts in the review of decisions concerning 
non-horizontal mergers, evidence should be factually accurate, reliable 
and consistent, contain all the information that must be taken into 
account to assess a complex situation and be capable of substantiating 
the conclusions drawn from it. The burden then might shift to the 
defendant to rebut a prima facie case of anti-competitive effects. 
 
Recommendations 
• The Commission should clarify that none of the seven factors listed in 
para. 20 can be used in isolation to prove anti-competitive 
foreclosure. They should always be included in a plausible theory of 
consumer harm based on cogent and convincing evidence.  
• The Guidance paper should state explicitly that no finding of abuse 
will be made without the position of competitors and 
customers/suppliers having been examined.  
• The Commission should consider introducing rules for a structured 
assessment of the most common practices, able to capture the likely 
consumer harm. In the absence of evidence of actual consumer harm, 
a consistent story supported by evidence should always be provided 
showing that in the specific case under consideration consumer harm 
is likely. The short- and long-term impact on consumers should be 
clearly spelled out.  
• The Commission should provide factually accurate, reliable and 
consistent evidence that the chosen theory of anti-competitive 
foreclosure applies to the specific circumstances of the case, as it is 
not sufficient to state that a generic theory could apply to a similar 
conduct in some circumstances. 
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1.2.2 Truncated assessments  
In para. 22 of the Guidance paper, the Commission states that if it appears 
that the conduct can only raise obstacles to competition and that it creates 
no efficiencies, “its anti-competitive effect may be inferred” and it is not 
necessary for the Commission to carry out an assessment of the likely 
consumer harm.  
The Guidance paper mentions two examples of conduct that it 
believes fall into this category. The first is when a dominant firm prevents 
its customers from testing the products of competitors (either by making 
this a condition of sale or by offering payments not to test competitors’ 
products). The second example mentioned by the Commission is when a 
dominant firm pays a distributor or customer to delay the introduction of a 
competitor’s product.  
These examples highlight the problems with the suggestion that there 
is a non-trivial class of conduct where a truncated assessment would be 
appropriate. We argue that the examples must be interpreted narrowly, so 
as to include only conduct that by itself is clearly likely to harm consumers. 
Otherwise, the result would be a serious weakening of the standard of 
proof for the Commission and the shift on the dominant company of the 
burden of providing convincing evidence that the conduct has legitimate 
justifications and does not have the alleged anti-competitive effect. 
More generally, we submit that situations in which the conduct in 
question clearly raises obstacles to competition and yet creates no 
efficiencies are so rare that any benefit that might result from having the 
option of conducting a truncated analysis in these cases is outweighed by 
the risk that the Commission might mistakenly use a truncated analysis in a 
situation in which a fuller analysis of the effects on consumer welfare is 
warranted. Accordingly, we suggest that the Commission modifies para. 22 
of the Guidance paper to define more narrowly the (exceptional) cases in 
which it is allowed to avoid a full assessment of anti-competitive 
foreclosure.  
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Recommendations 
• The circumstances under which the Commission is allowed to avoid 
a full assessment of anti-competitive foreclosure, including presump-
tions of illegality with reversal of burden of proof, should be narrow-
ly justified, viewed as strictly exceptional and interpreted 
accordingly.  
1.3 Price-based exclusionary conduct and the ‘as efficient 
competitor’ test  
In explaining the concept of ‘anti-competitive foreclosure’ as it applies to 
price-based conduct in the Guidance paper, the Commission states that it 
will ‘normally’ intervene where the conduct is capable of hampering 
competition from competitors that are as efficient as the dominant 
company. This principle has been developed by some economists to 
provide a rule for predatory pricing (prices below an appropriate measure 
of cost):26 we consider it to represent a clear and sensible approach, and if 
followed consistently it would improve upon the approach adopted in the 
EU in existing case law. 
However, in the Guidance paper the Commission goes on (para. 24) 
to indicate that, in certain circumstances, it may depart from this principle 
and intervene even though the conduct would not foreclose an ‘as efficient 
competitor’ (AEC). The Commission suggests that departing from the AEC 
principle could be appropriate if, for example, the relevant market is one in 
which network and/or learning effects are important.27 In such markets, 
new entrants will naturally have higher costs at the time of entry than an 
established dominant firm, usually because of a lack of economies of scale 
or scope comparable to the dominant firm. Under these conditions, strict 
                                                     
26  See O’Donoghue & Padilla (2006), op. cit., pp. 189-191.  
27  On network and learning effects, see i.a. M. Spence, “Competition, Entry and 
Antitrust Policy”, in Salop et al. (1981), Strategy, Predation and Antitrust Analysis; 
M. Katz and C. Shapiro (1994), System Competition and Network Effects, Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, Vol. 8, No. 2, p. 107; and R. Pardolesi and A. Renda (2003), 
“How Safe is the King’s Throne? Network Externalities on Trial”, in P. 
Cucinotta, R. Pardolesi and R. Van Den Bergh (eds), Post-Chicago Developments 
in Antitrust Law, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing. 
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application of the AEC test might permit the dominant firm to engage in 
pricing conduct that would deter entry by firms who could become at least 
as efficient as the dominant firm if they were able to establish themselves in 
the market. 
The concerns that lead the Commission to consider departing from 
the AEC principle are understandable as a matter of economic theory. As a 
practical matter, however, the Commission’s proposed approach is 
problematic. In particular, while applying the AEC test is not necessarily 
without its own complications, the complications and uncertainty faced by 
dominant firms would be that much greater if, in addition, they had to 
contend with the possibility that their conduct would be assessed by 
something other than the AEC principle. Again, as already recalled, it is 
essential that the criteria selected by the Commission are such that 
dominant firms can engage in self-assessment of the potential abusive 
nature of their market conduct. Related to this point, but even more 
important from a public policy perspective, there is an obvious risk that the 
possibility of departure from the AEC principle could make dominant 
firms overly cautious about responding to competition and could result in 
higher prices to consumers. 
For these reasons, we believe the Commission must define far more 
precisely the circumstances under which it would depart from the AEC 
principle (see recommendation below). If the Commission is unwilling or 
unable to define these circumstances with precision, then the Commission 
should apply the AEC principle in all cases, even though there might be 
cases in which strict adherence to this principle could allow anti-
competitive conduct to go unpunished. 
We believe that the Commission’s concern should be regarded as 
reasonable in one specific situation, i.e. in relation to a competitor that is 
aggressive, but not yet efficient, which provokes a reaction from the 
dominant firm that is specifically aimed at the competitor in question. In 
that situation the Commission should rely on the principle that prohibits 
‘reprisal’ abuses. Illegal ‘reprisals’ include conduct aimed at an aggressive 
competitor and intended to warn it to compete less vigorously. That would 
be a more sound and justifiable approach than the not-yet-as-efficient 
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theory, and a more practical one.28 It would be helpful if the Commission 
stated that this is the only situation in which a less efficient competitor 
should be protected. 
 
Recommendations 
• The Commission should state that the only situation in which a less 
efficient competitor would be protected is when: i) the competitor is 
aggressive, but not yet efficient, and this provokes a reaction from the 
dominant firm and ii) the conduct of the dominant company is 
specifically aimed at the competitor in question.  
• In that situation the Commission should rely on the principle that 
prohibits ‘reprisal’ abuses, rather than the not-yet-as-efficient theory.  
1.4 The cost benchmark 
1.4.1 Choosing the appropriate cost benchmark 
The Guidance paper identifies two cost benchmarks that the Commission is 
likely to use in determining whether a dominant firm’s pricing should be 
regarded as exclusionary: average avoidable cost (AAC) and long-run 
average incremental cost (LRAIC).29  
                                                     
28  Some Commission officials believe that when a company is ‘super dominant’ 
(undefined), it is appropriate to protect less efficient competitors, to prevent 
complete monopolisation, or as a supplement to regulatory measures. See also 
the Opinion of Advocate General Fennelly delivered on 29 October 1998 in 
Compagnie maritime belge transports SA (C-395/96 P), Compagnie maritime belge SA 
(C-395/96 P) and Dafra-Lines A/S (C-396/96 P) v Commission, Joined cases C-
395/96 P and C-396/96 P, [2000] E.C.R. I-1365 in para. 137. For a definition and 
discussion of superdominance, see O’Donoghue & Padilla (2006), op. cit., pp. 
166-168; and Geradin et al. (2005), The Concept of Dominance in EC Competition 
Law (available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=770144).  
29  AAC is defined as “the average of the costs that could have been avoided if the 
company had not produced a discrete amount of (extra) output, in this case the 
amount allegedly the subject of abusive conduct”. LRAIC is defined as “the 
average of all the (variable and fixed) costs that a company incurs to produce a 
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However, the cost benchmarks chosen by the Commission are not 
applied consistently throughout the Guidance paper.  
• With regard to single-product loyalty discounts, the Guidance paper 
states that: i) where the effective price is below AAC, as a general rule 
the discount scheme is capable of foreclosing equally efficient 
competitors;30 ii) where the effective price is between AAC and 
LRAIC, the Commission will investigate whether other factors point 
to the conclusion that entry or expansion even by as efficient 
competitors is likely to be affected.31  
• By contrast, in all other cases, failure to cover LRAIC is normally 
considered sufficient to conclude that a practice is capable of excluding 
equally efficient competitors.32  
• Failure to cover AAC is only taken into account in the analysis of profit 
sacrifice, which is a separate requisite for unlawful predation.33 
The reason for the difference of treatment between single-product 
discounts and other pricing policies is not entirely clear. Similar to loyalty 
discounts, pricing policies such as bundled discounts and price squeeze are 
                                                                                                                                       
particular product” (see Guidance paper, § 26, footnote 2, p. C.45/11). Unlike 
AAC, LRAIC includes also sunk fixed costs. 
30  See Guidance paper, § 44. 
31  In particular, the Commission will investigate whether and to what extent rivals 
have realistic and effective counterstrategies at their disposal. According to the 
Guidance paper, the Commission will consider that a rebate scheme is capable 
of foreclosing equally efficient competitors if rivals do not have such 
counterstrategies at their disposal. In particular, this could happen when 
competitors can also use a non-contestable portion of their buyers’ demand as 
leverage to decrease the price of the relevant range. See Guidance paper, § 44. 
Surprisingly, the Commission is willing to adopt a more tolerant approach 
where entry or expansion by minor competitors is likely to be more difficult, 
due to the existence of two or more firms holding a significant market power 
over given shares of customers’ requirements. 
32  See Guidance paper, §§ 60 (multi-product rebates), 67 (predation) and 80 
(margin squeeze). 
33  According to the Commission, pricing below AAC indicates that a firm is 
sacrificing profits in the short term with a view to strengthening or maintaining 
its market power (see Guidance paper, § 64). 
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sustainable in the long run, since they do not necessarily entail any loss or 
reduction in profits. If a dominant firm prices below LRAIC for a 
prolonged period, sooner or later an equally efficient competitor could be 
forced out of the market. However, when a dominant firm implements a 
pricing policy for a limited period, LRAIC may not be the most appropriate 
cost benchmark to establish whether equally efficient competitors could be 
excluded. In the short run, costs that vary only in the long run cannot be 
avoided and should not be taken into account when establishing whether a 
given price is profitable. As long as AAC are covered, an equally efficient 
rival would not suffer any loss that it could avoid by exiting. As a 
consequence, it would not have incentives to exit the market. 
On the other hand, when a market is characterised by very high sunk 
fixed costs and very low avoidable costs, the use of an AAC benchmark 
might not adequately reflect the specific economic reality of the industry 
concerned. Competitors would not sustain the sunk investment needed to 
enter a market if they did not have a reasonable prospect of recouping all 
product-specific costs. In such a case, LRAIC could offer a more realistic 
picture of the costs of entering a market and remaining in it.34 In any case, 
the Commission should take into account that, in many settings, pricing 
below LRAIC but above AAC could be economically rational for a 
dominant firm.35 
 
 
 
                                                     
34  However, it should be noted that, if the contested practice is implemented for a 
long period, AAC and LRAIC tend to yield similar outcomes. Normally, the 
longer the time period considered, the larger AAC will be, since more and more 
sunk costs become avoidable over time.  
35  A firm pricing below LRAIC could cover its variable costs and make a 
contribution to its already sunk fixed costs. Accordingly, the firm would not be 
necessarily be better off by discontinuing or reducing production. For instance, 
firms active in cyclical industries may sell at below LRAIC during the 
downturn of the business cycle, and recoup during the upturn. 
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Recommendations 
• In order to establish whether equally efficient competitors could be 
foreclosed, the Commission should use two different cost 
benchmarks, not only for single-product loyalty discounts, but also 
for other pricing policies. 
• Where prices are below AAC, the Commission should conclude that 
the contested practice is capable of foreclosing equally efficient 
competitors. Where prices are between AAC and LRAIC, the 
Commission should investigate whether additional factors point to 
the conclusion that entry or expansion by equally efficient 
competitors is likely to be affected.  
1.4.2 Common costs 
The Guidance paper says very little about the allocation of common costs 
(i.e. costs incurred in common for a number of products). The cost 
benchmarks favoured by the paper (i.e. LRAIC and AAC) do not include an 
appropriate share of common costs. However, in a footnote, the 
Commission states that, “[i]n situations where common costs are 
significant, they may have to be taken into account when assessing the 
ability to foreclose equally efficient competitors”.36 
We believe that the Commission is right in wanting to take common 
costs into account when they are important (as, for instance, in network 
industries). Ignoring common costs may create a significant bias against 
rivals who are only active in one product and have to cover all the stand-
alone costs of that product. Furthermore, the AKZO judgment, setting forth 
cost-based standards to determine predation, certainly gives no indication 
that common costs can be ignored.37 
Unfortunately, the Commission gives: i) very limited indications on 
the circumstances in which common costs should be taken into 
                                                     
36  See Guidance paper, § 26, footnote 2, p. C.45/11. 
37  Case C-62/86, AKZO [1991] ECR I-3359. 
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consideration38 and ii) no guidance on the vexing question as to which cost 
allocation methodologies it will accept.  
With regard to point i) above, the opinion of our group is that the 
Commission should be particularly cautious when deciding whether 
common costs should be taken into account. A form of incremental cost is 
generally more appropriate, for the following reasons:  
• Antitrust rules should not prevent dominant firms from taking advantage of 
their scope economies when setting prices. When a firm decides whether 
to produce an additional good, it normally compares incremental 
costs and incremental revenues. If the firm concerned already covers 
common costs through the sales of other products, whose demand is 
less elastic, a rule requiring that each product makes an appropriate 
contribution to general overheads could result in higher prices. 
Dominant firms should not be obliged to behave as if they were less 
efficient; 
• Competitors should be encouraged to expand their product range, if it is 
more efficient to do so; 
• The allocation of common costs to different products is particularly complex 
and uncertain. Although many conventional accounting methods have 
been proposed, there are no unambiguous and commonly accepted 
criteria for allocating common costs. 
In light of the above, common costs should be taken into account only 
under very specific circumstances. The Commission should demonstrate 
not only that common costs are significant, but also that competitors could 
not reasonably realize similar scope economies by expanding their product 
range (not necessarily to produce exactly the same products as the 
dominant firm), so as to cover common costs through the sale of other 
products. 
As to the criteria for allocating common costs, we believe that the 
Commission should not prescribe particular cost allocation methods. This 
might be appropriate in a regulatory context, but not in a competition law 
framework. In light of the high margin of discretion and uncertainty 
inherent in the allocation of common costs, antitrust authorities and courts 
                                                     
38  The Guidance paper says only that common costs “may” be taken into account 
where they are “significant” (ibid.). 
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ought to accept the cost allocation method employed by the dominant firm, 
provided that it is reasonable (e.g. used by cost accountants, economists or 
regulatory authorities and consistently used by the dominant firm itself 
across its different activities (where, obviously, there are shared costs). 
 
Recommendations 
• Common costs should be taken into account where: i) they are 
significant; and ii) competitors cannot realize similar scope economies 
by expanding their product range, so as to cover common costs 
through the sale of other products.  
• The Commission should accept any cost allocation method for 
common costs employed by a multi-product company, provided that 
it is: i) reasonable and normally accepted and used by cost 
accountants, economists or regulatory authorities; and ii) consistently 
used by the dominant firm. 
1.5 Efficiency defence 
The issue of the standard for anti-competitive foreclosure is closely linked 
to the role of objective justification and efficiency defences. In principle, the 
shift to a more effects-based application of Article 82 EC should entail that 
efficiencies are better integrated into the assessment of the effects of the 
observed conduct. Yet, if enforcement is based on negative presumptions 
or truncated assessments, or if the ‘consumer harm’ requirement for anti-
competitive foreclosure remains underdeveloped, defences could play a 
crucial role. 
The effect of the approach to efficiencies in the Guidance paper is to 
import into Article 82 (under defences) the four cumulative conditions of 
Article 81(3) EC.39 The conditions, as proposed in the Guidance paper in 
para. 30, read as follows:  
a) The efficiencies have been, or are likely to be, realised as a result of the 
conduct. They may, for example, include technical improvements in 
                                                     
39  See the Commission’s Guidelines on the application of Article 81(3) of the 
Treaty (OJ C 101, 27.4.2004, p. 97).  
38 | THE GENERAL APPROACH TO EXCLUSIONARY ABUSES 
 
the quality of goods, or a reduction in the cost of production or 
distribution. 
b) The conduct is indispensable to the realisation of those efficiencies: there 
must be no less anti-competitive alternatives to the conduct that are 
capable of producing the same efficiencies. 
c) The likely efficiencies brought about by the conduct outweigh any likely 
negative effects on competition and consumer welfare in the affected 
markets. 
d) The conduct does not eliminate effective competition, by removing all or 
most existing sources of actual or potential competition.  
We consider the Commission’s choice to import the Article 81(3) 
methodology into Article 82 to be undesirable for a number of reasons.  
• First, the 81(3) methodology conceived for granting exemptions under 
Article 81 does not seem fit for the assessment of unilateral conduct of 
dominant companies. In particular, importing the four conditions of 
Article 81(3) into Article 82, while making the objective justification 
and efficiency defences more systematic, also makes them less likely 
to be satisfied. An efficiency defence based on the four cumulative 
conditions is not a flexible one: the last (negative) requirement (for 
conduct not to eliminate competition) means that a dominant firm’s 
conduct, although socially desirable because it creates efficiencies, 
will still be prohibited. The very presence of a dominant position 
means that in practice it will be usually presumed that the condition 
for consumers getting a fair share of the benefit will not be satisfied. 
This approach is particularly inadequate in those highly innovative 
markets where quasi-monopoly positions may exist for a period only 
to be rapidly eroded.  
• Secondly, even today – with less strict requirements – there has been no 
Article 82 case where an efficiency defence was successful. In the Guidance 
paper the Commission stresses that, when claiming an efficiency 
defence, the dominant undertaking “will generally be expected to 
demonstrate, with a sufficient degree of probability and on the basis 
of verifiable evidence”, that the four conditions are fulfilled (para. 
30). On the other hand, when assessing whether the conduct is 
necessary and proportionate and whether the likely efficiencies 
outweigh any likely negative effects on competition and consumer 
welfare, the Commission enjoys a lot of discretion. So, while the 81(3) 
approach sounds scientific, in practice few dominant players are 
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likely to prevail in defending themselves. This is not merely because 
firms with market power need more compelling efficiency 
justification than those who do not have market power, but also 
because the test as set out in the Guidance paper is skewed against 
the defence succeeding where a firm is dominant. 
The strict conditions for a defence underline the importance not to 
postpone the assessment of the efficiency of a conduct to the last stage of 
the analysis. When assessing anti-competitive foreclosure the approach to 
the impact of the conduct on the market should not be artificially blinded: 
the whole impact of the conduct should be taken into account, including 
the resulting efficiencies. Otherwise, efficiencies risk being systematically 
underestimated.  
Indeed, if the impugned conduct produces efficiencies such that on 
balance consumer welfare improves, then on the basis of the general 
approach to exclusionary conduct set out by the Commission in para. 19 of 
the Guidance paper there is no abuse. On this point, the opinion of 
Advocate-General Jacobs in Syfait remains very persuasive.40 If a course of 
conduct, such as an increase in output coupled with a decrease in prices in 
order to gain market share, enabled a dominant firm to reap economies of 
scale without escaping competitive pressure entirely, no abuse should be 
found to start with.  
The ‘efficiency defence’ becomes all the odder when it entails a 
consideration of longer-term perspectives, typically relating to innovation 
or investment in infrastructure. For example, claiming that compulsory 
licensing of IP-protected goods would adversely affect the dominant firm’s 
innovation incentives would hardly qualify as an ‘efficiency defence’ as 
conceived of in the Guidance paper. In those cases, a longer-term 
perspective could help the Commission in assessing the impact of certain 
remedies on consumer welfare.  
The main argument why the Commission might want to park this 
discussion in a defence (as opposed to the overall assessment of abuse 
itself) seems of a more practical order: the competition authority should not 
                                                     
40  Syfait was decided on procedural grounds. When the case came before the 
Court of Justice again in Sot.Lelos, Advocate General Colomer was more 
cautious than Advocate General Jacobs on the issue.  The Court finally ruled on 
the basis of a ‘commercial interests’ argument.  
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be forced to go on a fishing expedition for possible ‘efficiencies’ as part of 
its assessment of abuse, and later held accountable for it on review. 
However, putting efficiencies at the tail-end of the discussion, as a defence, 
makes them practically useless: how likely is it that a dominant firm whose 
conduct was found to have led to an anti-competitive foreclosure – even if 
the welfare assessment might not have been complete – would manage to 
turn the case around by proving efficiencies? The transplant of the Article 
81(3) EC criteria into Article 82 EC makes this inquiry even more artificial, 
and transforms the efficiency defence into an uphill battle for defendants.  
Against this background, we recommend the Commission to adopt a 
more nuanced approach to efficiencies: in line with the effects-based 
approach outlined in para. 19 of the Guidance paper, the consideration of 
counterbalancing efficiencies should be part of the assessment of abuse. 
However, the defendant should have the burden of alleging and 
substantiating efficiencies. Once the efficiency is alleged (with a relatively 
low burden of proof), it is then up to the competition authority to take it 
fully into account in its determination of abuse.41 In any event, such an 
approach should apply to the assessment of the impact of public 
intervention on dynamic efficiency and longer-term consumer welfare, 
which must be balanced against shorter-term considerations and not kept 
for a later stage.  
 
Recommendations 
• In line with the effects-based approach outlined in para. 19 of the 
Guidance paper, the consideration of counterbalancing efficiencies 
should be part of the assessment of abuse, rather than left as a 
defence. However, the defendant should have the burden of alleging 
efficiencies.  
1.6 Use of economic evidence 
As the Commission moves towards a more effects-based approach to 
exclusionary abuses, it is reasonable to expect that the treatment of 
                                                     
41  This is how the Court of First Instance understood the respective roles of the 
Commission and the company in Microsoft (see paras 688 and 1144).  
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available economic evidence will play a greater role in the future. In this 
respect, there are factual circumstances that could be regarded as providing 
prima facie evidence that the conduct in question was legal. These factual 
circumstances may be divided into two categories of economic evidence, 
one that refers to the foreclosure condition and the other that refers to the 
consumer harm condition.  
In this respect, it must be remembered that both categories of 
economic evidence provide elements that are sufficient to establish a 
presumption of legality. This is due to the fact that, since foreclosure and 
consumer harm are necessary for a conduct to be defined as an 
exclusionary abuse, both have to be proved for a conduct to be deemed 
abusive, whereas it is sufficient to disprove one to conclude that a conduct 
is not anti-competitive. 
1.6.1 Evidence regarding the foreclosure condition 
If the conduct has been in place for a sufficient period of time, the market 
position of the rivals or their behaviour may indicate that the conduct did 
not have foreclosing effects.42 The following factors may be considered as 
relevant:  
1) Distribution of market shares. If during the relevant period of time 
rivals have increased their market shares, while the market share of 
the dominant undertaking declined, this should constitute prima facie 
evidence that the conduct is unlikely to have exerted a foreclosure 
impact in the relevant market.  
2) Rivals’ strategies in terms of price, quality and other selling conditions. If, 
after controlling for the influence of exogenous factors, there is robust 
and verifiable evidence that rivals have reduced their price, improved 
the quality of their products or offered their clients better selling 
conditions while continuing to earn profits, we should conclude that 
the conduct under investigation is likely to be unable to foreclose 
rivals. 
                                                     
42  The time span that has to be considered sufficient depends on the chosen theory 
of harm as some anti-competitive strategies require more time than others to 
produce their foreclosing effects. 
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3) Entry. Foreclosure may also have the effect of impeding the entry of 
potential competitors. Hence, if during the relevant period of time 
new firms entered the relevant market on a sufficient scale to make 
their business viable – so that entry corresponds to the definition 
provided in the Guidance paper in para. 16, and is likely to take place 
swiftly and with sufficient scale – we should conclude that it is 
unlikely that the conduct was able to foreclose the market. 
1.6.2 Evidence regarding the consumer harm condition 
If the conduct has been in place for a sufficient period of time, the 
behaviour of consumers may provide indications that the conduct did not 
harm them and, thus, was not anti-competitive.43 The following elements 
may be relevant:  
1) Price. If during the relevant period of time, taking into account the 
influence of exogenous factors, consumers have been normally 
charged a lower price to purchase the same quantity of products, we 
should infer that the conduct of the dominant undertaking is unlikely 
to result in consumer harm. Of course, this type of argument is 
difficult to use in predation cases, as a lack of consumer harm should 
be appraised by definition over a sufficiently long time frame, 
including the recoupment period. 
2) Quantity. If, taking into account the influence of exogenous factors, 
consumers buy a larger quantity of product even if the price has not 
changed, this reflects an upward shift of their demand curve, and 
thus an increase in their willingness to pay. Hence, for certain cases, if 
during the relevant period of time consumers have purchased a 
larger quantity of the product, this could be taken as (rebuttable) 
evidence that the conduct under investigation is unlikely to cause 
                                                     
43  The length of the ‘sufficient period of time’ depends on the chosen theory of 
harm. It is apparent that a temporary price reduction or a temporary quantity 
increase is consistent with a predatory strategy. Therefore, when predation is 
alleged, this type of evidence cannot be considered sufficient to prove that the 
observed strategy is legal. However, also in this case, if the price reduction, or 
the quantity increase, outlasts the reasonable period of time devoted to the 
exclusion of rivals, it shows that it is unlikely that consumers are harmed by the 
conduct of the dominant firm. 
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consumer harm, or at least has not caused harm until the moment in 
which the case is being decided. On the other hand, for predation 
cases – as well as all cases in which the exclusionary abuse entails a 
price cut in the short term, such as discounts – the issue may be more 
complex, as during the predatory period, when prices are low, the 
quantity demanded will go up.  
3) Quality. Even if the quantity purchased has not increased and the 
price has not declined, consumers can be better-off if the quality of 
the product they buy has increased, as their willingness to pay for the 
higher quality products is likely to be higher and thus to contribute 
positively to their welfare. If there is robust and verifiable evidence 
that, during the relevant period of time, consumers have had access 
to products of better quality, we should infer that the alleged abusive 
conduct is unlikely to be anti-competitive.44 
The various types of economic evidence discussed in this section are 
not irrefutable. It is always possible that if the conduct under investigation 
had not taken place, the dominant undertaking’s market share would have 
declined more than it actually has, that rivals would have charged even 
lower prices, expanded their output, offered better products or proposed 
better selling conditions, or that more new competitors would have entered 
the market. Similarly, it is always possible that, in the absence of the 
alleged abusive conduct, consumers would have enjoyed even lower prices, 
purchased an even larger quantity or obtained even higher quality 
products.  
Accordingly, economic evidence could be used only to establish a 
prima facie evidence that the contested conduct was not likely to lead to 
actual foreclosure or consumer harm. Nevertheless, it would be useful if 
the Commission clarified whether and how available evidence will be 
taken into account in establishing a case for exclusionary conduct. This 
would at once: i) introduce more symmetry in the Guidance paper, where 
only the factors to be taken into account to establish dominance and abuse 
are clarified, but not those that may constitute evidence that the conduct 
may indeed have been lawful; ii) highlight the importance of economic 
                                                     
44  This, of course, requires that: i) the quality of the product can be unequivocally 
defined; and ii) there is no way to infer that, absent the alleged exclusionary 
conduct, quality would have improved even more.  
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evidence in a more effects-based approach; and iii) help dominant firms 
assess the likely anti-competitiveness of their conduct.  
Finally, the use of economic evidence crucially depends on the phase 
of investigation that is considered. In particular: 
i) At a preliminary stage (interim measures), concrete evidence of 
foreclosure or consumer harm cannot be required. 
ii) At the inquiry stage, the Commission should gather concrete 
economic evidence. 
iii) If by the time the Commission finally gets to decide the case, there is 
further evidence that foreclosure did not occur or consumers were 
not harmed, then that evidence should be taken into account.  
iv) As for the time period between the Commission decision and any 
subsequent judgments, the Commission decision must be assessed on 
the basis of the facts as they were known at the time of the decision. 
The Commission cannot be held accountable if its theory of harm 
failed to materialise after the Decision (on the assumption that 
remedies are not immediately or properly implemented). 
 
Recommendations 
• The Commission should clarify that in some circumstances, economic 
evidence may create a prima facie presumption that the conduct at 
hand was unlikely to lead to anti-competitive foreclosure. The 
Commission should also list and describe the type of evidence that 
may be relevant in this respect. 
• The factual circumstances described above should be considered 
sufficient to prove the legality of a certain conduct, unless the 
Commission can provide cogent and verifiable evidence that all the 
relevant and beneficial facts would have occurred on a larger scale in 
the absence of the conduct of the dominant undertaking. 
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2. SPECIFIC FORMS OF ABUSE 
fter illustrating the Commission’s general approach to exclusionary 
conduct, the Guidance paper dedicates specific sections to a 
number of specific forms of abuse, such as exclusive dealing, 
single-product and bundled rebates, tying and bundling, predation, refusal 
to supply and margin squeeze. 
In these sections, the Commission applies to specific forms of conduct 
the general approach illustrated in Part III of the Guidance paper. It is 
useful to recall that this general approach is fundamentally built, inter alia, 
on the following elements: 
• For conduct to be considered exclusionary under Article 82 EC 
Treaty, the undertaking that engages in that conduct should be found 
to hold a dominant position. Dominance is defined as “a position of 
economic strength enjoyed by an undertaking, which enables it to 
prevent effective competition being maintained on a relevant market, 
by affording it the power to behave to an appreciable extent 
independently of its competitors, its customers and ultimately of 
consumers”.45 
• The key concept in the scrutiny of allegedly exclusionary abuses is 
that of anti-competitive foreclosure, defined as a situation in which 
the conduct at hand is likely to lead to both foreclosure of as-efficient 
competitors and harm to consumers. 
• For price-based exclusionary conduct, the Commission clarifies 
already in Part III of the Guidance paper (para. 26) that in assessing 
whether the conduct is likely to foreclose as-efficient competitors, it 
                                                     
45   Guidance paper, para. 10, quoting United Brands and Hoffman-La Roche. 
A 
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will rely on two cost benchmarks, i.e. average avoidable cost (AAC) 
and long-run average incremental cost (LRAIC).46 More in detail:  
[F]ailure to cover AAC indicates that the dominant 
undertaking is sacrificing profits in the short term and that an 
equally efficient competitor cannot serve the targeted customers 
without incurring a loss (...) Failure to cover LRAIC indicates that 
the dominant undertaking is not recovering all the (attributable) 
fixed costs of producing the good or service in question and that 
an equally efficient competitor could be foreclosed from the 
market. 
In the next sections, we comment on the sections of the Guidance 
paper dedicated to specific forms of abuse, and also on the consistency of 
each section with the general approach contained in Part III of the 
Guidance paper.  
2.1 Single-product rebates 
2.1.1 Rebates with effects ‘similar to’ exclusive agreements 
Rebates that are conditional on a particular form of purchasing behaviour 
(e.g. purchases over a defined reference period in excess of a certain 
threshold) are discussed in the Guidance paper under the general heading 
“exclusive dealing”. As a matter of economics, this treatment of conditional 
rebates is generally understandable, particularly in the case of retroactive 
rebates or any other form of conditional rebate in which there is a sharp 
reduction in the incremental price when volumes exceed a specified 
threshold level. 
The problem with the Commission’s treatment of conditional rebates 
as a ‘soft form’ of exclusive dealing thus is not that the analogy is incorrect. 
                                                     
46  As defined by the Guidance paper, AAC is the average of the costs that could 
have been avoided if the company had not produced a discrete amount of 
(extra) output – in this case, the amount allegedly the subject of abusive 
conduct. LRAIC is the average of all the (variable and fixed) costs that a 
company incurs to produce a particular product. LRAIC is usually above AAC 
because, in contrast to AAC (which only includes fixed costs if incurred during 
the period under examination), LRAIC includes product-specific fixed costs 
made before the period in which allegedly abusive conduct took place. 
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The problem is that, given the hostility in European competition law to 
exclusive dealing on the part of dominant firms (misplaced in our view47), 
there is a risk that some users of the Guidance paper might conclude that, 
because conditional rebates are analogous to exclusive dealing, then 
conditional rebates on the part of a dominant firm should receive the same 
harsh treatment as exclusive dealing by a dominant firm – i.e. closer to a per 
se prohibition than to an effects-based approach. This would be an 
unfortunate outcome because conditional rebates can be an important form 
of competition that benefits consumers.  
The loyalty-inducing effect of retroactive rebates will be greatest (and 
the analogy with exclusive dealing strongest) when rebate schemes are 
customer-specific and involve individualised volume thresholds. When 
thresholds are set on a customer-specific basis, the supplier is likely to set 
the threshold at a level near, but not quite equal to, the customer’s 
anticipated demand. By providing a prize in the form of retroactive rebates, 
the supplier provides the customer with an incentive to increase its 
purchases from the supplier to get over the threshold. Given this objective, 
the supplier does not want to set the threshold too low (because then 
customers can qualify for retroactive rebates without necessarily increasing 
their purchases from the supplier to any significant extent). The supplier 
also does not want to set the threshold at an unrealistically high level 
(because if the threshold is beyond reach, again it will not have the desired 
effect on customers’ purchases). Thus, when retroactive rebate schemes are 
customer specific, thresholds are likely to be set at near (but not quite equal 
to) each customer’s level of anticipated demand. In this situation, any effort 
by rival suppliers to persuade customers to switch non-trivial volumes is 
                                                     
47  Allowing dominant companies the right to bid for exclusivity can be pro-
competitive. Some important buyers insist on buying from a sole supplier, to 
get the lowest prices, or because they are more efficient if they deal with a 
single supplier. A guarantee of exclusivity can also be necessary to justify 
customer-specific investment. See e.g. E. Elhauge, “Why above-cost price cuts to 
drive out entrants are not predatory – and the implications for defining costs 
and market power”, Yale Law Journal, Vol. 112, 2003, pp. 681-827. Exclusive 
dealing is common in various sectors of industry, in particular in connection 
with capital equipment that requires regular maintenance and servicing, e.g. 
engines of aircraft. 
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likely to cause many customers to lose the retroactive rebates they 
otherwise would have earned.  
In contrast, when thresholds are not set on a customer-specific basis, 
the supplier will have to compromise in setting threshold levels. While the 
resulting rebate scheme is likely still to have strong loyalty-inducing effects 
on some customers, for other customers the thresholds will be 
unrealistically high (and therefore will have no loyalty-inducing effect) and 
for other customers the thresholds will be too easy to meet. When 
thresholds are unrealistically high or too low, rival suppliers will have an 
easier time persuading customers to switch significant volumes because, in 
either case, the customer can switch significant volumes without sacrificing 
retroactive rebates.  
These observations suggest that the analogy to exclusive dealing is 
strongest in the case of retroactive rebates with individualised thresholds. 
These observations also suggest that – as occurs in the assessment of the 
competitive effects of exclusive dealing contracts – when analysing the 
competitive effects of retroactive rebates the Commission should consider:  
1) the likely volume of sales accounted for by customers whose 
purchases are likely to be less than the threshold level; and  
2) for the latter type of customers, the difference between their 
anticipated purchases and the threshold level. These are the volumes 
that can be considered as ‘available’ to rival suppliers – i.e. if 
customers switched these volumes to rival suppliers, they would not 
be sacrificing retroactive rebates from the dominant supplier.  
As with exclusive dealing, if the size of this ‘available market’ is large 
(relative to rivals’ minimum efficient scale), then it is less likely that the 
retroactive rebate scheme can have anti-competitive foreclosure effects. 
 
 
Recommendations 
• The Commission should clarify that, in pointing out the similarities 
between conditional rebates and exclusive dealing, it does not mean 
to suggest that conditional rebates on the part of dominant firms 
should be treated as equivalent to exclusive dealing for competition 
law purposes.  
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• The Commission should clarify that conditional rebates by dominant 
firms should be assessed according to the same effects-based methods 
that the Commission will use to assess other forms of potentially 
exclusionary conduct (e.g. predation). 
• The Commission should also clarify that any analysis of the 
exclusionary effects of conditional rebates should consider the extent 
of the market ‘available’ to rival suppliers without causing customers 
to lose any retroactive rebates that the customers otherwise would 
have received from the dominant supplier. If the ‘available market’ so 
defined is large relative to rivals’ minimum efficient scale, then it is 
less likely that the dominant firm’s rebate scheme can have anti-
competitive foreclosure effects. 
 
2.1.2 Retroactive rebates 
Rebates may be ‘incremental’ (given only on purchases above a threshold) 
or ‘retroactive’ (given on all previous purchases made during the period, 
after the threshold is reached). The effect of what the Commission says 
about incremental rebates is that, if the net or effective price resulting from 
the rebate is above the dominant company’s Long Run Average 
Incremental Cost of producing that quantity, then the Commission is 
unlikely to intervene. This is clear and intelligible.48  
For retroactive rebates, what the Commission says is far more 
complicated. As explained below, some members of our group feel that the 
Commission’s proposed treatment of retroactive rebates is unnecessarily 
complicated while other members believe that the Commission’s proposed 
treatment is generally sensible. 
                                                     
48  Para. 43 of the Guidance paper states: “[t]he lower the estimated effective price 
over the relevant range is compared to the average price of the dominant 
supplier, the stronger the loyalty-enhancing effect. However, as long as the 
effective price remains consistently above the LRAIC of the dominant 
undertaking, this would normally allow an equally efficient competitor to 
compete profitably notwithstanding the rebate. In those circumstances the 
rebate is normally not capable of foreclosing in an anti-competitive way.” 
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2.1.2.1 The ‘relevant range’ 
The Commission proposes a multi-step procedure for determining whether 
a dominant firm’s system of retroactive rebates has the potential to have 
anti-competitive foreclosing effects.  
• First, one must estimate how much of the buyer’s purchase 
requirements could realistically be switched to a rival (the 
‘contestable share’: para. 42). This presumably depends on both the 
buyer and the rival, and would be different for different buyers, and 
for different rivals (for example it would depend on their long-term 
contracts). Even the members of our group who are sympathetic to 
the Commission’s approach acknowledge that a dominant firm 
cannot estimate any of these quantities with precision or confidence, 
without confidential information about both its customers and its 
rivals that it cannot be expected to have. 
• Then, one must estimate the part of the demand that the buyer is 
likely to switch (the ‘relevant range’ para. 40) or the proportion that 
the rival might offer to supply of the tranche offered by the dominant 
company subject to the rebate. This is not the same as the contestable 
share (para. 41). It is a subjective matter, very much within the 
discretion of the buyers, and not (except by coincidence) the same for 
all buyers, or for a given buyer at different times.49  
• One must then estimate, for the ‘relevant range’, the price that the 
rival would have to offer to compensate the buyer for the loss of the 
rebate, if the buyer switched that quantity (para. 41). The dominant 
firm must estimate the price that the rival would have to offer, for the 
‘relevant range’, to match the dominant firm’s ‘effective’ price after 
deducting the rebate. The ‘effective’ price is the nominal price of the 
tranche subject to the rebate, minus the rebate given on earlier 
purchases.  
• Because the rival must offer, for that quantity, a price that is less than 
the dominant firm’s nominal price for the ‘relevant range’ part of that 
                                                     
49  One should not assume that the competitor's offer is made precisely at a time 
when the buyer is just below the threshold quantity and is choosing which 
supplier to buy from (para. 40 of the Guidance paper says that this is not the 
right approach). 
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tranche (because the rival also has to match the amount of the rebate 
on previous purchases), the dominant firm must ensure that its 
‘effective price’ (that is, its price including the rebate for previous 
purchases: paras. 41-44) for the ‘relevant range’ is above its LRAIC. 
2.1.2.2 The ‘relevant range’ - objections 
The members of our group who are critical of the Guidance paper’s 
treatment of retroactive rebates suggest that are a number of fundamental 
objections to this complicated ‘relevant range’ approach for retroactive 
rebates.  
The Commission does not explain how a dominant company could 
possibly calculate the ‘relevant range’ with anything approaching 
precision. Critics of the Commission’s approach suggest that this approach 
could be used only with hindsight and access to confidential information. 
They suggest that the Commission’s approach is therefore contrary to the 
general principle that the legal rules must be capable of being applied by 
dominant companies.50 
Critics of the Commission’s approach also insist: 
1. It may lead dominant firms to keep their prices up, whereas competition 
law is intended in general to bring them down, except in cases of 
clear below-cost pricing. 
2. It may be difficult or impossible for the dominant firm to make the 
calculations needed. It is unworkable in practice, too complicated, and 
because the ‘relevant range’ is imprecise and subjective, it cannot be 
precisely known to the dominant company. 
3. It would be arbitrary, because the ‘contestable share’ and the ‘relevant 
range’ may be different for different buyers (because they may have 
different requirements) and different rivals (because they may have 
different production capacities). There is no rational way of deciding 
whose share or range should be used. The Commission’s description 
does not envisage situations with more than one competitor or with 
more than one buyer. For a cautious dominant company, the effect 
would presumably be to raise the company’s price to the highest of 
the alternative levels. 
                                                     
50   See supra, note 4 and accompanying text.  
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4. If the ‘relevant range’ is small, then the dominant company’s ‘effective price’ 
for that quantity will be lower (because the retroactive rebate on 
purchases below the threshold is spread over a smaller quantity) and 
therefore it is more likely that its effective price will be illegal. This means 
that the smaller the quantity likely to be bought from rivals, the 
higher the dominant firm must raise its effective price, to provide a 
price umbrella for potential suppliers of that quantity. This is a rather 
counter-intuitive result, because if the contestable volumes are really 
small, then it makes less sense for a dominant firm to try to exclude 
rivals from competing for these (small) volumes through a targeted 
predation strategy. 
5. It draws an unjustified distinction between incremental and retroactive 
rebates. The Commission does not propose the use of the relevant 
range or contestable share concepts for incremental rebates (and 
should not do so). Accordingly, it should not propose the use of these 
concepts for retroactive rebates, as there is no reason to believe that 
the latter are inherently more likely to lead to prices below the 
dominant company’s costs than incremental rebates. It all depends on 
the size of the rebates.  
6. The Commission treats the loss of a chance to get a price reduction (lost if 
the buyer chooses to switch) as if it was a penalty paid by the buyer for 
switching. The paper should consider the possibly anti-competitive 
nature of the conduct, not its possible effect on the buyer’s purchases. 
The dominant company should be able to apply the test to its own 
conduct, to determine whether it is lawful. Buyer’s conduct may be 
influenced by many factors, and may not always be in the buyer’s 
own interest. 
7. It is unjustifiably regulatory, because it gives the Commission the task 
of managing the dominant company's price, on the basis of an 
artificial calculation, to protect rivals from price competition. 
8. It is unreasonable to say that the pricing obligations of a dominant company 
vary according to the wishes of any one of its potential customers. But this 
is exactly what happens if the concept of the relevant range is 
adopted, as the size of the relevant range very much depends on the 
requirements and preferences of individual buyers. 
9. The approach is even more uncertain than the above description 
suggests, because the Commission adds more qualifications, not already 
mentioned. 
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a. The Commission may look at ‘other factors’ if the dominant 
company’s price is between average avoidable cost (AAC) and 
LRAIC (para. 44).  
b. The Commission will decide whether the threshold is 
individualised (para. 45). However, even a standard quantity 
discount may be illegal if it “approximates [to] the 
requirements of an appreciable proportion of customers” (para. 
45). No indication is given of what “approximates” and 
“appreciable proportion” mean, and even a dominant company 
does not necessarily know what its customers’ total 
requirements are.  
c. The Commission will see if “realistic and effective 
counterstrategies” are available to rivals (para. 44). 
d. Last, the dominant firm may justify a given price by reference 
to efficiencies (para. 46). 
2.1.2.3 The critics’ view of the practical effects of the Guidance paper’s 
treatment of retroactive rebates, and a suggested alternative 
The members of our group who are critical of the Guidance paper’s 
treatment of retroactive rebates have the following views with respect to 
the practical effects of the approach described in the Guidance paper.  
• First, the effect of the Commission’s approach will be to discourage dominant 
companies from giving retroactive rebates, or to cause them to give small 
rebates, a result that could not have been intended by the 
Commission and that would hamper competition.  
• On the other hand, if the Commission decided not to insist on the 
unworkable concept of the relevant range, the approach adopted 
would cause less (but still considerable) problems. An approach using 
the contestable share concept but not the ‘relevant range’ would be open to 
many of the same objections, except that it would be less complicated 
and more workable, because a dominant company may be able to 
estimate the contestable share (although that is sometimes very 
difficult). In particular, the problem that the contestable share is 
different for different buyers and for different competitors would 
remain – the dominant company would have to estimate whichever 
contestable share might be appropriate: to be cautious, it may base its 
estimate on the capacity of the smallest competitor (if the dominant 
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company knows that) and the requirements of the most specialised 
buyer or buyers. The dominant company would then have to 
calculate what price the small competitor would have to offer for 
those requirements to compensate the buyers of that quantity for the 
loss of the retroactive rebate. Finally, it would have to ensure that the 
rebate does not lead to its price for that quantity being below LRAIC.  
• Moreover, if the Commission would give up both the relevant range and the 
contestable share concepts, in practice the final result would be only to 
require the net effective price per unit for the threshold quantity plus one, 
after granting the rebate, to be above LRAIC. That would be a simple, 
clear and justified rule, would provide a safe harbour, and make the 
rules on both kinds of rebates consistent.  
 
The critics’ recommendations 
• The Commission should certainly abandon the relevant range 
concept, and should probably also abandon the contestable share test. 
• The Commission should state clearly that the net effective price for 
the threshold quantity plus one unit after granting the rebate should 
be above LRAIC. This should entirely replace the discussion of 
retroactive rebates.  
 
2.1.2.4 An alternative view of the Guidance paper’s treatment of 
retroactive rebates 
As already mentioned, other members of our group have more sympathy 
with the approach to retroactive rebates proposed in the Guidance paper, 
especially in the case where the dominant firm sets individualised 
thresholds. These members of our group agree that the Commission’s 
effective price test (based on the ‘relevant range’) is potentially difficult for 
dominant firms to implement. But they are concerned that the alternative 
formulation of the test proposed above (i.e. basing the analysis on the net 
effective price for the threshold quantity plus one unit), while easier to 
implement, is too weak and will miss cases where retroactive rebates are 
being used as part of a ‘targeted predation’ strategy. 
To explain, consider the following numerical example: 
• A customer’s total order is 110 units. 
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• List price is €10/unit. 
• A retroactive rebate of €1 per unit is paid on all purchases once this 
customer’s total purchases exceed 100 units (the threshold will vary 
from customer to customer, depending on the anticipated level of 
demand). 
• The dominant firm’s costs are €8 per unit. 
• An equally efficient rival has the potential to attract up to 30 of the 
110 units (‘relevant range’). 
Under these assumptions, the dominant firm’s rebate structure would 
be unobjectionable under ‘threshold quantity plus one unit’ proposed 
above. At 101 units, total revenue would be €909 and total costs would be 
€808. 
The members of our group who sympathise with the Commission on 
retroactive rebates are concerned that this test can easily produce wrong 
results.  
The sympathisers agree that, if the customer in this example switched 
only 9 units (so that it still bought 101 units from the dominant firm and 
therefore still qualified for the dominant firm’s retroactive rebate), the rival 
firm would only have to price below €9 (i.e. the price that the customer 
pays to the dominant firm on incremental units, once total purchases have 
crossed the threshold level of 100). 
Suppose however that, in order to achieve an efficient scale of 
operations, rivals cannot survive on picking up the difference (9 units in 
this example) between each customer’s total demand and each customer’s 
threshold level. As noted above, whether this is true and whether the 
‘available market’ left over by a dominant firm’s rebate scheme is sizeable 
relative to rivals’ minimum efficient scale is an issue that any analysis of 
the competitive effects of retroactive rebates should consider. But suppose 
that, in order to achieve a sustainable scale, rivals need to induce enough 
switching such that a significant number of customers would have to 
sacrifice the retroactive rebates that they would otherwise receive from the 
dominant firm.  
In that situation, the members of our group who sympathise with the 
Commission’s approach to retroactive rebates think that it is sensible to 
consider the price that the rival would have to offer in order to compensate 
customers for giving up the dominant firm’s retroactive rebates. In the 
example above, given the structure of the dominant firm’s rebate system, a 
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rival would have to offer less than €6.33 per unit to have any hope of 
attracting the 30 units that the customer in the example could potentially 
switch to a rival supplier.51 Thus, even if the rival had the same costs as the 
dominant firm (€8 per unit), the rival would be unable to compete for the 
contestable volumes.  
Demonstrating that the effective price over the ‘relevant range’ is less 
than the dominant firm’s LRAIC or AAC should not be viewed as sufficient 
evidence that a dominant firm is engaged in an anti-competitive 
foreclosure strategy. As the critics of the Guidance paper’s approach 
emphasise, the effective price can vary across customers (because of 
differences in the extent to which customers are willing to switch) and 
across rivals (for example, some rivals may have less capacity to attract 
volume from the dominant firm). If the effective price is less than the 
dominant firm’s costs only for some rivals (but not others) and/or only 
with respect to some customers (but not, say, all major customers), then it 
becomes less likely that the dominant firm is truly engaged in an anti-
competitive foreclosure strategy. 
Moreover, the Commission should be required to show that, even if 
the effective price is below cost, the conduct can be seen as part of an 
overall predatory strategy, which ultimately would result in higher prices 
for consumers, when the dominant firm ‘recoups’ the investment it has 
made in predating its rivals. The Commission implies that this analysis of 
recoupment is not necessary. The Commission claims that conditional 
rebates differ from predation because they do not entail a profit sacrifice 
(para. 37 of the Guidance paper). We disagree with this proposition as a 
general statement. Recoupment will typically be required also in a case of 
predatory rebates, because foregoing margins on non-contestable volumes 
in order to reduce prices on contestable volumes can involve a profit 
sacrifice for the dominant firm. 
                                                     
51  The effective price (€6.33) equals the total amount the customer would pay if all 
purchases were made from the dominant firm (€990 = 110 x €9) less the amount 
the customer would pay for non-contestable volumes if the customer switched 
(€800 = (110 – 30) x €10), all divided by the contestable volume (30). In our 
example, if the rival is able to switch less than 55 units, the effective price 
always falls below cost.  
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As mentioned, the members of our group who generally have sympathy 
with the Guidance paper’s approach to retroactive rebates accept that dominant 
firms may have difficulty deciding in advance whether a proposed rebate structure 
will be regarded as objectionable by the Commission. However, these members of 
our group note that dominant firms have ways of managing this risk. For 
example, if the regulatory risk associated with retroactive rebates is 
considered too great, dominant firms can use incremental rebates rather 
than retroactive rebates as a means of generating incremental sales 
(because, as discussed above, it is easier for dominant firms to determine 
whether a system of incremental rebates is likely to be regarded as 
objectionable by the Commission). Incremental rebates and retroactive 
rebates are not equivalent in terms of their incentive effects, for example, in 
promoting sales effort on the part of distributors (when sales are near but 
not yet equal to the threshold level). But dominant firms particularly 
concerned about the regulatory risk associated with retroactive rebates 
might decide that foregoing the incentive benefits associated with 
retroactive rebates might be a price worth paying. Alternatively, a 
dominant firm can offer a standardised retroactive rebate scheme rather 
than an individualised one. Such an alternative would also result in weaker 
incentive effects but it is also less likely to lead to effective prices that are 
below cost for a significant part of the market (as long as buyers are 
sufficiently heterogeneous). 
The sympathisers’ recommendations 
• The Commission should clarify that any analysis of the exclusionary 
effects of conditional rebates should consider the extent of the market 
‘available’ to rival suppliers without causing customers to lose any 
retroactive rebates that the customers otherwise would have received 
from the dominant supplier. If the ‘available market’ so defined is 
large relative to rivals’ minimum efficient scale, then it is less likely 
that the dominant firm’s rebate scheme can have anti-competitive 
foreclosure effects. 
• Even if the ‘available market’ as just defined is too small relative to 
rivals’ minimum efficient scale, the Commission should clarify that it 
will consider whether the effective prices of all rivals for contestable 
volumes fall below the dominant firm’s costs. Showing that effective 
prices for contestable volumes are below the dominant firm’s costs 
for only some rivals should not be sufficient to support a case of anti-
competitive foreclosure.  
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• The Commission should also clarify that, even if effective prices are 
below the dominant firm’s costs for the contestable volumes of some 
customers, the Commission is unlikely to intervene if there are other 
customers for which the effective price is greater than the dominant 
firm’s costs and where these other customers have contestable 
volumes larger in aggregate than the minimum efficient scale of an 
as-efficient competitor. 
• The Commission should also clarify that the overall framework for 
analysis of a rebate scheme will typically be a predatory one. It 
should therefore be required to explain why smaller existing rivals 
are not able to also engage in periods of low prices to match the 
dominant firm, and why the dominant firm can be expected to 
recoup the profit sacrifice resulting from offering rebates to 
consumers, once rivals are marginalised or forced to exit.  
 
2.2 Tying 
The section of the Guidance paper on tying and bundling recognises in 
para. 49 that “tying and bundling are common practices intended to 
provide customers with better products or offerings in more cost effective 
ways”. The Guidance paper however also cautions that, in some 
circumstances, tying or bundling can have anti-competitive foreclosure 
effects. Below, we comment on the proposed ‘distinct product’ test 
proposed in para. 51; we also provide some comments on the models of 
anti-competitive tying and bundling discussed by the Commission in the 
Guidance paper.  
2.2.1 The Commission’s formulation of the distinct product test  
A first step in any bundling case is determining whether the allegedly tying 
and tied products should be regarded as distinct products or whether they 
should instead be treated as part of integrated system (single product). The 
distinct product test acts as a screen for non-problematic cases before the 
detailed assessment of whether anti-competitive foreclosure exists.  
The Guidance paper proposes the following formulation of the 
distinct product test (para. 51): 
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Two products are distinct if, in the absence of tying or bundling, a 
substantial number of customers would purchase or would have 
purchased the tying product without also buying the tied product from 
the same supplier, thereby allowing stand-alone production for both the 
tying and the tied product.  
As a preliminary point we note that the wording of the test differs 
from the wording which the Commission has used in previous cases and 
which has been endorsed by the Court of First Instance: 
The Commission was also correct to state, at the same recital, that 
in the absence of independent demand for the allegedly tied product, there 
can be no question of separate products and no abusive tying. 
It would be helpful for the Commission to explain why it has 
deviated from the CFI’s wording of the distinct product test, i.e. the shift in 
emphasis from separate demand for the tied product to separate demand 
for the tying product and what consequences (if any) are intended. 
In any event, we recommend that the key question for the distinct 
product test should be whether, in the absence of tying or bundling, a 
substantial number of customers (at the relevant level of trade) would ‘mix 
and match’ – i.e. purchasing the tying product from the dominant firm 
while purchasing the tied product from a different supplier. When there is 
reason to believe that a substantial number of customers would ‘mix and 
match’ in the absence of tying or bundling, the Commission will find 
distinct products.  
There is a corollary to this approach, which is not mentioned in the 
Guidance paper but deserves emphasis. The other side of the distinct 
product test in the Guidance paper is that, if there is reason to believe that 
all but an insubstantial number of customers (at the relevant level of trade) 
still would have purchased the tying and tied product from the same 
supplier even if there had been no tying or bundling, then the products 
involved should not be regarded as distinct products.52  
                                                     
52  In investigating this issue, the comparison should be between customer 
behaviour in a world in which the dominant firm practices pure bundling and 
in a world in which the dominant firm instead practices mixed bundling, but 
where the difference between the dominant firm’s package price and its 
hypothetical standalone price for the tying product should be large enough to 
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The reason for emphasising this corollary is as follows. If all but an 
insubstantial number of customers still would have purchased the tying 
and tied products from the same supplier (i.e. the dominant firm) even in 
the absence of tying or bundling, then the case should not be analysed as a 
bundling case. In this case, the same market outcomes would have resulted 
even if the dominant firm had not engaged in tying or bundling, and hence 
there can be no causal link between the potential competition concerns and 
any tying or bundling. This said, there could still be competition problems 
in the affected markets for reasons other than tying (for example due to an 
unlawful refusal to supply).53 
Determining whether the products involved in a case of alleged 
bundling should be regarded as distinct products will obviously depend on 
the facts of the case. Questions arise, however, with respect to the statement 
in the Guidance paper that, in determining whether the distinct product 
test is satisfied the Commission will consider indirect evidence “such as the 
presence on the market of undertakings specialised in the manufacture or 
sale of the tied product without the tying product”.  
The Commission should recognise and confirm that, in applying the 
distinct product test the real issue is whether, during the period of the 
bundling, all but an insubstantial number of customers still would have 
purchased the tying and tied product from the same supplier (i.e. the 
dominant firm) even if the dominant firm had not engaged in tying or 
bundling. If the answer to this question is yes, then the products should not 
be regarded as distinct products and the case should not be analysed as a 
bundling case – regardless of whether, in the past, customers had 
purchased the tying and tied products from separate suppliers. 
                                                                                                                                       
permit competition from an as-efficient competitors in the market for the tied 
product. 
53  For further discussion of this causation point and its relevance to the Windows 
Media Player part of the Microsoft case, see Ahlborn & Evans, “The Microsoft 
Judgment and Its Implications for Competition Policy towards Dominant Firms 
in Europe”, Antitrust Law Journal (forthcoming 2009). See also M. Dolmans and 
T. Graf, “Analysis of Tying under Article 82 EC: The European Commission’s 
Microsoft Decision in Perspective”, World Competition, 4, 2004, pp. 225-44. 
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2.2.2 Comments on the models of anti-competitive bundling discussed in 
the Guidance paper 
The Guidance paper devotes seven paragraphs (paras. 52-58) to explaining 
the circumstances in which tying or bundling is most likely to have anti-
competitive effects. In view of the fact that mixed bundling is dealt with 
separately (paras. 59-61),54 it is clear in context that the analysis in these 
seven paragraphs pertains to pure bundling – i.e. to situations in which the 
dominant undertaking does not offer the tying product separately from the 
tied product. Even so, the fact that paras. 52-58 pertain to pure bundling should 
be clarified. 
The analysis in the Guidance paper of how pure bundling can have 
anti-competitive effects is generally consistent with the economic literature 
on this topic. The only obvious gap is the absence of any explicit discussion 
of the incentive that a dominant undertaking might have to foreclose 
competition in the market for a tied product that is currently a complement 
to the tying product but which has the potential to evolve into a substitute 
for the tying product (sometimes termed ‘defensive leveraging’ theory).55 It 
may be argued that this incentive to foreclose is already covered by para. 58 
of the Guidance paper, in which the Commission outlines how a dominant 
undertaking might want to foreclose competition in the market for an 
important complement in order to make it more difficult for new entrants 
to access the market for the tying product. This would be a defensible 
argument. Even so, given the importance of the ‘complement today, 
substitute tomorrow’ model in the economic literature, more explicit 
discussion of this model in the Guidance paper would be appropriate. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
54   See Section 2.3 above for comments. 
55  Dennis W. Carlton and Michael Waldman, “The Strategic Use of Tying to 
Preserve and Create Market Power in Evolving Industries”, Rand Journal of 
Economics, Vol. 33, summer, 2002, pp. 194-220. 
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Recommendations 
• The Commission should explain and why the Guidance paper uses a 
different wording for the distinct product test compared to the case 
law and should clarify the intended consequences (if any); 
• The key question for the distinct product test should be whether, in 
the absence of tying or bundling, a substantial number of customers 
would ‘mix and match’ – i.e. purchasing the tying product from the 
dominant firm while purchasing the tied product from a different 
supplier. 
• Further thought should be given to the statement in the Guidance 
paper that, in determining whether the distinct product test is 
satisfied the Commission will consider indirect evidence “such as the 
presence on the market of undertakings specialised in the 
manufacture or sale of the tied product without the tying product”. 
Such evidence may allow the conclusion that products are distinct in 
some circumstances but not in others. 
• The Commission should recognise and confirm that, in applying the 
distinct product test the evidence that ultimately matters is evidence 
which answers the key question set out above, namely whether, 
during the period of the bundling, all but an insubstantial number of 
customers (at the relevant level of trade) still would have purchased 
the tying and tied product from the same supplier (i.e. the dominant 
firm) even if the dominant firm had not engaged in tying or 
bundling.  
• The Commission should clarify that one of the situations in which 
tying and bundling can have anti-competitive effects is when the tied 
product is currently a complement to the tying product, but has the 
potential to evolve into a substitute of the tying product. 
2.3 Bundled discounts 
Competition issues arising from bundled discounts and rebates (bundled 
discounts) have not been addressed thoroughly in EC case law and 
decision practice. The Community institutions have generally held that 
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retroactive bundled discounts constitute a particularly harmful form of 
loyalty discount.56 In addition, they have held that bundled discounts may 
act as a tie-in within the meaning of Article 82, letter d), EC, thus hindering 
access to the market by competing suppliers of individual products 
included in the bundle.57 
The Commission Guidance paper contains only a few remarks on 
multi-product discounts. The Guidance paper sets out two alternative tests: 
i) when bundle-to-bundle competition is not reasonably possible, the 
Commission would normally not intervene if the incremental price paid by 
customers for each of the bundled products (this is equivalent to allocating 
the entire discount to that product) covers the LRAIC of including the 
product in the bundle; ii) when bundle-to-bundle competition is reasonably 
possible, a total bundle predation-style safe harbour would apply. 
Similar to single-product loyalty discounts, bundled discounts may 
be conditioned on the achievement of certain thresholds within a given 
reference period. Where demand for one or more of the bundled products 
is not entirely contestable, the competitive assessment of this form of 
bundled discounts can be extremely complex and uncertain. The Guidance 
paper takes into account the risks arising from the existence of an assured 
base of sales in the section on single-product loyalty discounts,58 but it says 
nothing on the same phenomenon with regard to bundled discounts. The 
                                                     
56  According to the traditional approach of the Community institutions, bundled 
discounts exacerbate the fidelity-inducing effect of a retroactive discount 
system, since the failure to reach the thresholds within the reference period may 
cause the loss of discounts over more than a single product line. See 
Commission decision of 9 June 1976, Case IV/29.020, Vitamins, O.J. L 223/27 
(1976), § 24; ECJ, Case 85/76 Hoffmann-La Roche v Commission [1979] ECR 965, § 
110; Commission decision of 5 December 1988, Case IV/31.900, BPB Industries 
plc, O.J. L 10/50 (1989), §§ 148-152.  
57  See ECJ, Case 85/76 Hoffmann-La Roche v Commission [1979] ECR 965, § 111; 
Commission decision of 7 October 1981, Case IV/29.491, Bandengroothandel 
Frieschebrug BV/NV Nederlandsche Banden-Industrie Michelin, O.J. L 353/33 
(1981), §§ 27 and 50; Commission decision of 22 December 1987, Case 
IV/30.787-31.488, Eurofix Bauco/Hilti, O.J. L 65 (1988), §§ 75 and 83; Commission 
decision of 20 June 2001, Case COMP/E-2/36.041/PO, Michelin, O.J. L 143/1 
(2002), §§ 256-258. 
58   See Guidance paper, §§ 37-45. 
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members of our group have expressed differing views on the treatment of 
single-product loyalty discounts.59 In any case, we believe that the 
Commission should address in more detail the issue of bundled discounts 
conditioned on the achievement of certain thresholds within a given 
reference period, so as to ensure a sufficient degree of consistency in the 
treatment of single-product and bundled discounts.  
The following paragraph provides some considerations on the 
treatment of bundled discounts. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that 
demand for competitive products included in the bundle is entirely 
contestable. 
2.3.1 The allocation of the discount to different bundled products 
As noted above, the Guidance paper states that, when bundle-to-bundle 
competition is not reasonably possible, the Commission would normally 
not intervene if the incremental price paid by customers for each of the 
bundled products covers the LRAIC of including the product in the bundle. 
The Guidance paper does not explicitly define the notion of incremental 
price. The Commission addresses this issue in more detail in the Discussion 
Paper (see paras. 190 ff., in particular para. 192). The Discussion Paper 
clarifies that “the incremental price of a product C sold in a discounted 
bundle ABC is the price of ABC less the sum of the stand-alone prices of A 
and B (or the price of AB if such an option exists)”. This is equivalent to 
allocating the overall discount granted by the dominant firm to the product 
concerned. 
In order to guarantee that an equally efficient rival offering only one 
product is able to compete, the Guidance paper implies that the 
incremental price of each of the bundled products should be above cost. 
Such a strict test, applied to each product in a dominant undertaking’s 
bundle, could over-deter. Especially when the bundle consists of numerous 
products, the allocation of the discount to each of the bundled products 
may lead to very low incremental prices.  
Suppose that a dominant firm grants a percentage discount on the 
price of the bundled products, provided that the purchases of those 
products achieve or exceed certain thresholds during a given reference 
                                                     
59  See above, Sections 2.1.2.3 and 2.1.2.4. 
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period. If the discount is calculated on the price of many products and its 
rate is not trivial, the incremental price of each product analyzed in 
isolation could fall below cost. Nonetheless, equally efficient rivals may still 
be able to compete if competitors offer a subset of the bundled products. 
For competitors offering a subset of the bundled products, the relevant 
inquiry is the incremental price of the subset of bundled products relative 
to the incremental cost of this subset. If the incremental price of the relevant 
subset exceeds incremental cost, then the dominant undertaking’s bundle 
discount cannot exclude equally efficient competitors – even though the 
bundle discount might imply incremental prices below cost for single 
products within the bundle.  
In light of the above, rather than comparing the incremental price and 
cost of each product in the dominant undertaking’s bundle, it seems 
preferable to begin the analysis by focusing on the subsets of products 
actually offered by competitors. The analysis should be conducted for 
single products only when there are competitors that offer only one of the 
products in the dominant undertaking’s bundle and only when these 
single-product competitors account for a significant share of the 
competition that the dominant undertaking faces with respect to these 
products. If instead most of the competition to the dominant undertaking 
in the supply of these products comes from competitors who produce 
multiple products also offered by the dominant undertaking, then a single-
product analysis is unlikely to be appropriate.  
In determining the appropriate set of products to use in conducting 
the analysis of incremental prices and costs, the analysis should also 
consider whether there are significant obstacles to the expansion of rivals’ 
product range and/or rivals cannot cooperate with other suppliers to offer 
a bundle including a subset of the bundled products. If competitors can 
easily expand their product range or engage in other forms of bundling 
counter-strategies, then bundled discounts are less likely to have a 
foreclosing effect, even if the incremental price is below incremental cost 
for the subsets of bundled products currently offered by competitors. When 
such options are available to competitors, the price-cost test should also be 
conducted with respect to the subset of products covered by these bundling 
counter-strategies.  
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Recommendation 
• The discount should be allocated to a subset including all the 
bundled products reasonably open to competition, unless it is 
possible to demonstrate that a different allocation is more 
appropriate. Allocation to single bundled products, and/or to smaller 
subsets of the competitive products, may be appropriate where: i) 
competitors producing only one product, or a smaller subset of the 
competitive products, account for a significant share of the 
competition that the dominant firm faces with respect to these 
products; and ii) competitors cannot expand their product range or 
engage in other effective forms of bundling counter-strategies, so as 
to offer a subset including all the competitive products. In these cases, 
the discount should be allocated to the largest subsets of the 
competitive products that are offered, or could reasonably be offered, 
by competitors, either alone or jointly with other producers. 
 
2.4 Predation and profit sacrifice 
In the AKZO case the Court stated two rules.60 First, it is illegal to charge 
prices below average variable cost. Second, it is illegal to charge prices 
below average total cost if there is evidence of intent to force a competitor 
out of the market. That was clear. 
On the other hand, the Guidance paper allows a reading of Article 82 
which goes much further, and is totally unsatisfactory. With this reading, 
the Commission would change the law (not merely describe a situation 
coming under the second AKZO rule). According to paras. 63-65, 
“[d]eliberately foregoing profits in the short term, to foreclose a 
competitor” (referred to as ‘profit sacrifice’) is said to be illegal. In 
particular, it is illegal if the conduct “led in the short term to net revenues 
lower than could have been expected from a reasonable alternative 
conduct, i.e., whether the dominant undertaking incurred a loss that it 
could have avoided”.  
                                                     
60   Case C-62/86, AKZO [1991] ECR I-3359. 
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In explaining why it proposes to broaden the definition of predation 
to include the concept of ‘profit sacrifice’, the Guidance paper explains in 
footnote 42: “If the estimate of cost is based on the direct cost of production 
(as registered in the undertaking’s accounts), it may not adequately capture 
whether or not there has been a sacrifice”. The Commission seems to have 
in mind a case, such as the case brought by the US Department of Justice 
against American Airlines,61 in which the DOJ alleged that, in order to 
defeat new entry on particular routes, American Airlines diverted planes 
that could have generated more revenue in the short run on alternative 
routes to the routes where the entry was occurring, in order to flood these 
routes with additional flights and to persuade the new entrant to exit. In 
this case, revenues covered variable costs as measured in accounting terms; 
but the DOJ alleged that American Airlines’ revenues on the competitive 
routes did not cover the airline’s opportunity costs – i.e. the revenue that its 
aircrafts could have generated if they had been deployed on other routes.  
The DOJ’s attempt to include the concept of opportunity cost when 
assessing whether prices are predatory was understandable as a matter of 
economics. Opportunity cost is at the heart of economics. When analysing 
the cost of using resources in any particular activity, the correct measure of 
cost as a matter of economics is not accounting cost; it is the highest valued 
alternative use of those resources.62 
The section of the Guidance paper on predation would have been 
clearer if the paper had simply said that, in measuring costs, the 
Commission will not necessarily restrict itself to accounting costs but will 
also consider opportunity costs. Instead, the Commission has written the 
section on predation in a way that creates the potential for much confusion. 
Read literally, the Commission seems to expand the AKZO rules in two 
respects: first, pricing above average total cost may be considered 
                                                     
61  In United States v. AMR Corp., the government alleged that American Airlines 
had violated the Sherman Act by expanding its capacity on routes that low-cost 
carriers had entered, such that the incremental costs incurred in the expansion 
were not covered by the incremental revenue it added. See United States v. AMR 
Corp., 353 F.3D 1109 (10th Cir. 2003). 
62  On the notion of ‘opportunity cost’, see i.a. A. Alchian, “Cost”, International 
Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, Vol. 3, New York, NY: Macmillan, 1968, pp. 
404-415. 
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exclusionary; and, second, the showing ex post with the benefit of hindsight 
that a more profitable (or less unprofitable) pricing strategy might 
reasonably have been available may be taken as evidence of ‘intent’ to 
exclude a competitor. 
Based on the case law, only few examples are known where the 
European Courts were faced with exclusionary behaviour which involved 
above-cost pricing. However, the European Court of Justice never 
condemned above-cost pricing as such, but only in connection with the 
simultaneous application of other kinds of abusive conduct (such as 
exclusionary price cuts).63 Accordingly, from this case law no support can 
be found for the suggestion that, by itself, a ‘profit sacrifice’ by a dominant 
undertaking constitutes an abuse within the meaning of Article 82 EC.  
Indeed, we see no justification for any suggestion in the Guidance 
paper that a profit sacrifice could be illegal if the price is above average 
total costs.64 Any threat of illegality of above cost profit sacrifices is likely to 
discourage price competition. While it is not always easy for companies, 
especially multi-product companies, to allocate the various costs to the 
products they sell, they are used to performing cost analyses. To this extent, 
the AKZO rule fits in with the decision-making process companies can be 
expected to engage in. However, to require companies to analyse 
alternative pricing strategies (and determine what might, from a regulatory 
perspective, be more ‘reasonable’ conduct amongst several alternatives) 
certainly adds a considerable degree of uncertainty and complexity, and 
therefore transaction costs.  
We are not aware of evidence (and the Commission has not 
suggested that there is any) showing that profitable pricing strategies of 
dominant companies have ever led to substantial foreclosures, which might 
possibly justify discouraging price competition and the imposition of 
additional transaction costs in many cases. Rather, as with other parts of 
                                                     
63  E.g. Case C-395/96P and C-396/96P, Compagnie Maritime (CEWAL) v. 
Commission [2000] ECR I-1365, paras 115-117. See also the Opinion of AG 
Fennelly, in paras 111-139. 
64  For a critical review of the ‘profit sacrifice’ test in the broader context of 
exclusionary abuse, see the CEPS Special Report by John Temple Lang, The 
Requirements for a Commission Notice on the Concept of Abuse under Article 82 EC, 
CEPS, Brussels, 2008, pp. 29-30.  
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the Guidance paper, we are concerned that the Commission is attempting 
to make provision for an unusual or extreme theoretical case – causing 
considerable extra cost of doing business to many companies in many 
situations and ultimately with the risk of findings of abusive conduct that 
are not justified. 
Furthermore, the suggestion that above-cost profit sacrifices can be 
predatory is inconsistent with the Commission’s own basic as-efficient-
competitor principle.65 Indeed, the Commission makes no distinction 
between the effects of the ‘profit sacrificing’ on as efficient compared to less 
efficient competitors. 
Moreover, this suggestion reaching beyond the AKZO-principles is 
unworkable, as it: 
• Is extremely vague and difficult to apply, especially when it comes to 
deciding what pricing alternatives were reasonable, at the time when 
the conduct began. 
• Does not distinguish between foreclosure that is legitimate and lawful (due 
to offering better value), and foreclosure that is unlawful (because the 
means used are anti-competitive for some identifiable reason). In 
other words, the serious ambiguity in what the Commission says 
about rebates is also potentially a flaw in what it says about ‘profit 
sacrifice’. 
• Would require cumbersome enforcement actions. It is hard to imagine that 
the ‘profit sacrifice’ test could be applied unless there was clear 
evidence that the dominant company had considered two courses of 
action and deliberately chosen the less profitable one in order to 
foreclose a competitor. As an intention to foreclose competitors (in 
some sense) is relevant under both the second AKZO principle and 
the suggested new ‘profit sacrifice’ test, surprise inspections may be 
needed with either test. 
Nevertheless, if the suggestion that ‘above-cost profit sacrifices’ can 
be predatory were upheld by the courts (which is doubtful), it would be so 
broad that defences would have to be very clearly recognised. The 
Commission only says efficiencies to achieve economies of scale or “related 
to expanding the market” will be considered. But with or without the 
                                                     
65   See above, Section 1.2.2. 
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‘above-cost profit sacrifice’ suggestion, defences should be clearly accepted 
at least for: 
• meeting competition,66 
• incurring promotional expenditure and loss-leading, 
• obtaining economies of scale in network industries, 
• starting up big investments and 
• reducing excess capacity in a recession. 
In all these cases, a company may legitimately be financially or 
commercially obliged to sell below its average total costs, sometimes for 
substantial periods, in order to break even.67 If the Commission’s proposals 
were accepted, this would render this company’s decisions more difficult in 
two ways. First, the company will have to assess whether less profitable 
prices may be considered exclusionary. Second, the company will have to 
assess whether alternative courses of action might be considered more 
reasonable by the Commission (or a national court). This makes an explicit 
recognition of these defences in the Guidance paper all the more necessary. 
 
Recommendations 
• The Commission should alter the Guidance paper to refer to profit 
sacrifice only as a possible example of the second AKZO rule.  
• Furthermore, the Commission should explicitly accept a number of 
defences against allegations of exclusionary pricing, including cases 
where the dominant firm acted for the purpose of meeting 
competition, engage in promotional expenditure and loss-leading, 
achieving economies of scale in network industries, start up big 
investments, or when the firm’s conduct was justified by excess 
capacity during a recession period. 
                                                     
66  The objection has been made that this defence cannot be accepted when the aim 
of competition law is viewed as the protection against consumer harm rather 
than the protection of competitors. We believe this objection is unfounded. 
When a dominant company meets the competition, while at least covering its 
average avoidable or variable costs, this is part and parcel of the competitive 
process from which consumers benefit. 
67  For a comprehensive treatment of these cases, see e.g. O’Donoghue & Padilla 
(2006), op. cit., pp. 286-302. 
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2.5 Refusal to contract  
The Guidance paper section on refusal to contract is vaguely drafted, and 
goes further than the existing case law. There is no reference to 
“exceptional circumstances” as in previous cases such as Magill, IMS and 
Microsoft, nor is it made clear that there can be a duty to contract only if the 
refusal is illegal for some specific and identifiable reason, and not merely 
because a contract would lead to more competition in the short term. 
As a result, we believe that in several respects the Guidance paper 
needs clear limiting principles. A duty to supply should arise only in 
“exceptional circumstances”. There should be dominance in the 
downstream market, or a likelihood of dominance if the refusal continues. 
There should also be evidence of actual foreclosure and actual or likely 
consumer harm. And the refusal should involve an asset or information 
that is indispensable, not only “convenient” for as efficient rivals in the 
downstream market to effectively compete with the dominant firm. Finally, 
there can be a duty to contract only if there is clear scope for added-value 
competition or innovation in the downstream market68. 
Furthermore: 
• Questions arise where in determining ‘indispensability’, the 
Commission appears to apply a negative presumption for 
discontinuation of supply cases. The Commission states that it is 
more likely to find that the indispensability condition is satisfied in 
favour of a finding of abuse; for example, if the recipient had made 
relationship-specific investments. As stated in para. 84 of the 
Guidance paper, “[i]f there has been a previous supply by the 
dominant firm, the latter will have to demonstrate why circumstances 
have actually changed in such a way that the continuation of its 
existing supply relationship would put in danger its adequate 
compensation”. This should not be interpreted as a reversal of the 
evidential burden of proof of indispensability or consumer harm.  In 
a rule of reason analysis, it may be appropriate to reverse the burden 
of proof in the context of ‘justification’ (para. 90) but not in the 
                                                     
68 It has always been clear that there is no duty to contract if the downstream 
activities consist only of distribution or re-sale without added-value services. In 
those circumstances refusal to contract cannot harm consumers. 
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context of indispensability or consumer harm (para 84). In other 
words, the existence of prior supply relationship may be ‘a relevant 
factor’, but it should not in itself be sufficient evidence of 
indispensability. Nor should the dominant company’s right to 
dispose freely of its property be reduced to an economic right to 
receive adequate compensation.  This may have a chilling effect on 
potentially welfare-enhancing transactions: if dominant companies 
enter into commercial agreements, once they supply someone they 
will risk being locked into that relationship for a long time. That may 
decrease their incentives to deal in the first place. Accordingly, the 
Commission should at least clarify under what conditions the 
dominant firm will be able to avoid continuation of previous supply. 
These should presumably include situations where the other 
conditions of a duty to deal are met, but where the customer refuses 
to or is unable to pay compensation, or where the customer refuses to 
supply the dominant firm on fair and reasonable terms with an input 
that is essential for the dominant firm (‘defensive suspension’).   
• The Commission states that a ‘potential market’ for the input may be 
enough (para. 69). This is consistent with the case law, but should be 
clarified. The mere existence of demand for the input cannot create a 
duty to supply. That would create a greater duty to share more 
valuable inventions. There can only be a duty if it would be 
economically rational for a non-dominant owner to contract, 
everything else being equal. It is difficult to imagine circumstances 
where there could be a duty to supply competitors with the dominant 
company’s final product. 
• The test of a “new kind of product for which there is a clear and 
unsatisfied demand”, under the Magill judgment, might indeed be an 
example of the harm to consumers that is required by Article 82(b), 
according to the Court in the Microsoft judgment. But the mere fact 
that production marketing or technical development of competitors is 
limited is not enough to cause harm to consumers (as Article 82(b) 
itself makes clear), so once again limiting principles are needed. If 
competitors are only copying the dominant company’s product, or 
merely producing the same product more cheaply without adding 
new functionality or new features, there is no justification for a duty 
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to supply under Article 82(b).69 Except in standards cases, where 
different considerations may apply, adding one more competitor is 
not a justification for imposing a duty to contract. In other words, 
Article 82 should only protect competition by innovation, not 
competition by imitation. 
• If product change that could have exclusionary effect is said to be 
justified by efficiencies, but exclusionary effect can be avoided or 
mitigated by a supply of information about the change, the dominant 
company may have a duty to avoid or reduce those effects by 
supplying the information. For example, a genuine improvement in 
one of two products that must work together may make it 
incompatible with competitors’ versions of the other product. In this 
situation a duty to provide competitors with the interoperability 
information they need may be envisaged, if the exceptional 
circumstances are met – i.e. the refusal relates to indispensable 
information, may cause competitors in one of the two markets to exit, 
and may lead to consumer harm in the medium- to long-term. 
• Since the mere refusal to licence an intellectual property right or to 
supply a property can never be in itself an exclusionary abuse, there 
must be some other identifiable abuse for which the refusal to supply 
is the vehicle, and for which the duty to contract is the appropriate 
remedy. 
2.5.1 Stifling of ‘follow-on innovation’ 
Para. 87 of the Guidance paper says consumers may be harmed if the 
refusal to contract is likely to stifle follow-on innovation. As expressed, this 
statement is not qualified by reference to ‘exceptional circumstances’ and is 
also both too vague and too broad. It would be obviously incorrect to 
suggest that there can be a duty to contract merely to enable a competitor to 
copy or marginally improve on a product already made by the dominant 
company. Moreover, nothing is said in the Guidance paper to suggest that 
this approach would apply only in ‘exceptional circumstances’. 
                                                     
69  The IMS Health interim measures decision of the Commission involved a single 
market and the decision would have allowed competitors to use IMS Health’s 
principal competitive advantage to produce products almost identical to those 
of IMS Health.  
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A rational and more correctly expressed principle based on Article 
82(b) would entail an assessment of the dynamic efficiencies generated by a 
duty to contact – e.g. if it adds one or more innovative competitors – 
against long-term dynamic efficiencies that may be associated with a 
refusal to supply. In this respect, the assessment of whether imposing a 
duty to contract will generate efficiencies in the longer-term or stifle 
incentives to invest is necessarily a case-by-case one. Useful criteria to reach 
an informed judgment can be identified, and entail that a refusal to contract 
is more likely to be anticompetitive if the following cumulative conditions 
are met: 
(a) If it eliminates or permanently handicaps competition, or creates or 
maintains dominance in a market for a new or improved product that 
competitors were producing (or would produce, if the evidence that 
they would do so is strong enough) and would be under competitive 
pressure to produce;  
(b) Where the duty to contract would provide competitors with an 
essential input otherwise unobtainable without giving competitors all 
or most of the dominant company’s competitive advantage or 
depriving it of the incentive to invest further;  
(c) Where consumer harm is shown, for instance, by restriction of 
innovation incentives or new products that would not be brought to 
market but for a license; 
(d) Where the IP owner’s incentives to innovate and invest are not 
reduced by a compulsory license (or perhaps a reduction is clearly 
outweighed by increased innovation by rivals, although this needs 
further discussion).  In any event, analysing the investment incentives 
of the parties requires caution. All incentives to invest must be 
carefully weighed in assessing refusals to contract. When the 
Commission decides to favour the rivals’ incentives to invest and 
innovate, such assessment must be based on clear evidence and not 
merely on an assumption that, if given access to the indispensable 
good, those rivals will actually invest and innovate. Similarly, when 
the Commission decides to favour the dominant firm’s incentives to 
invest and innovate, such assessment must be based on clear 
evidence and not merely on an assumption that a duty to supply 
would reduce its investment in innovation. In other words, in 
balancing, the hypothetical should not be favoured over the concrete. 
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Another important issue is that of pricing. In the context of the 
remedy, the price can be determined by reference to Fair, Reasonable And 
Non-Discriminatory (FRAND) principles – normally, equal to the 
incremental value derived by the licensee over the value derived from the 
next best alternative in an ex ante competitive environment. This can often 
be determined in practice by referring to proxies such as the price charged 
by owners of complementary essential IP for the same products, or the fee 
charged by the IP owner itself for similar IP in competitive conditions. 
 
Recommendations 
• The Commission should reconcile its treatment of refusal to contract 
with existing case law, and in particular with reference to the 
‘exceptional circumstances’.  
• The Commission should also make sure that its assessment of refusal 
to contract remains within the boundaries of the ‘anticompetitive 
foreclosure’ test that inspires the whole Guidance paper.  
• The Commission should clarify under what conditions the dominant 
firm will be able to avoid continuation of previous supply. 
• The Guidance paper should contain a clearer statement on the fact 
that only competition by innovation, not competition by imitation, is 
to be pursued by imposing a duty to contract when the relevant 
exceptional circumstances are met.  
• The Guidance paper should state that the treatment of refusals to 
contract requires an assessment of the long-term impacts of imposing 
a duty to contract on all players’ incentives to invest and innovate, as 
well as consumer welfare. Useful criteria can be identified and 
included in the Guidance, which would add clarity for market 
players and lead to more easily understandable and applicable rules.  
• The Commission should clarify under what (exceptional) 
circumstances it will protect follow-on innovation by competitors, 
and why. 
2.6 Margin squeeze 
The Guidance paper is unacceptably incomplete on the issue of margin or 
price squeeze. The Guidance paper, without explanation, joins the issue of 
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margin squeeze with refusals to deal (Section 9). The only other reference to 
margin squeeze appears in para. 80, where the Commission explains in 
basic and fairly obvious terms what a margin squeeze is and its preference 
for relying on the equally efficient competitor test, based on the long-run 
average incremental cost (LRAIC) of the downstream division of the 
integrated dominant undertaking. 
This very limited and unexplained treatment of margin squeeze is 
insufficient. Margin squeeze has featured prominently in a number of 
recent Commission decisions in Deutsche Telekom and Telefonica, and has 
been the subject of a detailed judgment by the Court of First Instance in 
Deutsche Telekom. The consequences of adverse findings may also be 
enormous: witness the €152 million fine in Telefonica (currently on appeal). 
Moreover, at national level, there have been a relatively large number 
of margin squeeze decisions, and a good deal of differences and confusion 
in approach.70 The issue is also likely to assume more importance as 
regulated markets move gradually away from full regulation to an 
environment in which competition law applies in full, as is the case in 
particular for electronic communications. In such instances a robust margin 
squeeze set of principles are essential to stop the market from lurching back 
to a position of ineffective competition again. The Guidance paper should 
therefore have treated the topic of margin squeeze more comprehensively. 
2.6.1 Margin squeeze needs to be considered as a separate abuse 
Whether and to what extent margin squeeze is to be considered as a 
separate abuse under Article 82 was an issue on which there was a measure 
of disagreement within the group.  
On the one hand, there was a minority within the group that argued 
that margin squeeze is not a separate abuse in its own right. This was based 
on the following considerations: 
a) A prohibition on margin squeeze pre-supposes that non-integrated rivals 
should be granted a guaranteed minimum profit margin. This is tested 
                                                     
70  For a review of the main national cases, see D. Geradin and R. O’Donoghue, 
“The Concurrent Application of Competition Law and Regulation: the Case of 
Margin Squeeze Abuses in the Telecommunications Sector”, Journal of 
Competition Law and Economics, No. 1, 2005, pp. 355–425. 
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using an ‘imputation’ test which, in essence, asks whether the 
dominant firm’s effective price is below the relevant wholesale and 
retail costs. The intuition behind the imputation test is that a negative 
spread in the case of the dominant firm is a good proxy for as-
efficient rivals being (potentially unlawfully) constrained. However, 
this test wrongly conflates two different things: i) data concerning the 
input price to the non-integrated rival and ii) the downstream costs of 
the incumbent as a proxy for the costs of an equally-efficient 
competitor. This risks guaranteeing a rival the right to a minimum 
profit, which could simply result in the sharing of a monopoly profit, 
with no consumer gain. 
b) A price squeeze may be found based on relatively arbitrary and irrelevant 
differences. Suppose for example the dominant charges €10 for the 
input to rivals (which costs €5 to produce) and charges €11 to final 
consumers, when the cost of distributing the product is €1.1, then in 
principle a margin squeeze exists. But if the second stage cost is €1, 
there would be no margin squeeze. However, whether the 
downstream distribution costs are €1 or €1.1, is not the material issue, 
since the problem lies elsewhere, in the consistent (high) profit that 
the integrated firm is gaining in the upstream market. 
In addition, from a more practical standpoint, considering margin 
squeeze as a separate abuse may be dangerous as it may constitute a 
shortcut to avoid more difficult predation cases. From a practical 
viewpoint, margin squeeze could in many circumstances be easier to prove 
than predation, since it relies on an examination of wholesale and retail 
prices (both observable) and the retail costs of the incumbent (harder to 
ascertain, but not impossible). In comparison, a predation test is more 
exacting on the authority.  
Accordingly, certain members of the group favoured a more 
straightforward test: 
i) If the downstream price is predatory, in that it does not cover the 
costs of the downstream operations (assuming the costs of procuring 
the input is the same for the integrated monopolist and the 
competitor), the standard approach applies. If the price is not 
predatory, that is the end of the predation analysis. 
ii) If predation is excluded, there are two possibilities: i) there is actual 
discrimination by the dominant firm in favour of its own operations, 
which would be a clear violation of Article 82(c) whether or not there 
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is an abuse of margin squeeze; or ii) there is uniform pricing but the 
price to non-integrated rivals might, at the limit, be considered 
exploitative. Again, this would be true whether or not there is a 
separate abuse of margin squeeze. Indeed, charging an ‘excessive’ 
price is in effect a refusal to deal, since it amounts to the most extreme 
form of discrimination.  
On the other hand, a majority of the group took as a starting point the 
conclusion in the judgments in Industrie des Poudres Sphériques and Deutsche 
Telekom that there is a separate abuse of margin squeeze. This was thought 
to be justified on the basis that, while margin squeeze has certain 
similarities to other abuses, many of these are apt to mislead. In other 
words, it is worthwhile to have a separate, although not unique, set of 
principles for margin squeeze cases. The reasons for this view can be 
summarised as follows. 
a) Margin squeeze cases under Article 82 EC are not the same as excessive 
pricing cases since: 
• The legal basis differs. Margin squeezes are cases of limiting 
production to the prejudice of consumers under Article 82(c): 
an excessive price is an abuse under Article 82(a). Indeed, 
calling an upstream price that gives rise to a margin squeeze 
abuse ‘excessive’ is likely to cause unnecessary confusion 
between exploitative and exclusionary abuses, making the 
abuses of margin squeeze and excessive pricing simultaneously 
less clear. 
• The legal tests differ. In assessing an excessive price, a 
commonly-applied benchmark is the firm’s own costs of 
supplying the relevant product or service compared to similar 
products in the same market or other related markets. In a 
margin squeeze case, a price is not excessive in relation to the 
dominant firm’s costs, but in relation to the relevant price and 
profit margin of as-efficient rivals on a downstream market. An 
excessive price is abusive because of its relation to the relevant 
costs of supplying a single product, whereas an exclusionary 
margin squeeze is concerned with the excess of the price 
relative to prices on another related market. Put differently, 
excessive prices concern the maximum legal price, whereas a 
margin squeeze concerns the minimum (non-exclusionary) profit.  
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b) Margin squeeze cases are not merely discrimination cases under Article 
82(c). It only makes sense to rely on Article 82(c) where the dominant 
firm is actually discriminating between its own operations and non-
integrated rivals’ (which is subject to a strict rule); in all other cases, 
Article 82(b) is the necessary legal basis, since any discrimination is at 
best implied. 
c) While margin squeeze cases are most analogous to predatory pricing cases, 
there are non-trivial differences that make distinguishing between them 
necessary, or certainly useful. This may, in some respects, bring margin 
squeeze cases under Article 82 out of line with recent US Supreme 
Court jurisprudence in Pacific Bell Telephone Co v linkLine 
Communications, Inc, but this is defensible: 
• The incentives differ as between pure predation and margin 
squeeze. In predation cases there is usually no need to consider 
whether or not the alleged predator would benefit from 
successfully excluding rivals—it always will, to some extent. In 
contrast, in a margin squeeze case, a vertically integrated 
company may have reduced incentives to exclude rivals from a 
downstream market, since the competitor will also be an 
upstream customer. A vertically integrated dominant company 
might lose more by losing upstream customers than it could 
gain as a result of their withdrawal from the downstream 
market.  
• In a margin squeeze case, the dominant company is not 
necessarily losing money overall (though it may be). It might be 
merely taking its profit upstream rather than downstream: the 
business engaged in a margin squeeze can be profitable on an 
‘end-to-end’ (i.e. integrated) basis throughout the period of 
abuse.  
• In a margin squeeze case, the question of future recoupment 
does not necessarily arise as it often does in predation cases. Or, 
more precisely, the fact that, in a margin squeeze case, the 
dominant firm remains profitable upstream can make 
recoupment more or less simultaneous so future recoupment 
issues do not arise. In a pure predation case, the loss-making 
and recoupment phases necessarily involve two different time 
periods. However, it is important to note that there is at least an 
opportunity cost to the dominant firm in a margin squeeze, since 
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higher wholesale prices it charges will mean lower sales to the 
downstream competitors who purchase wholesale inputs from 
it.  
• The remedies differ. In a pure predation case, the remedy is 
usually to increase the (loss-making) price. In a margin squeeze 
case, the dominant firm could be required (or given the option) 
to lower the input price, increase the retail price, or slightly 
adjust, either upwards or downwards, the upstream and retail 
prices. 
2.6.2 Margin squeeze and refusal to deal 
A difficult, and unresolved, issue is whether a margin squeeze is illegal 
only where the dominant firm has a legal duty to deal in the first place. The 
argument is that if the dominant firm has no legal duty to deal, there 
cannot be a duty to deal at a particular price that allows as efficient rivals to 
make a living profit. This question will wholly, or at least partly, answered 
in a pending Article 234 EC reference before the Court of Justice, where the 
Court is asked whether margin squeeze constitutes an abuse of dominance 
in a situation where there is no regulatory obligation to supply.71 It is also 
an issue in the pending Telefonica appeal before the Court of First Instance.  
It remains to be seen whether the Court of Justice or Court of First 
Instance will clarify this issue in a comprehensive manner. In the 
meantime, however, it is unhelpful for the Commission to include margin 
squeeze in its refusal to deal section in the Guidance paper without further 
comment or explanation. In particular, this was patently not the position 
that the Commission itself took in the Telefonica decision in 2007 (see para. 
309). It is also contrary to what the Commission said in its 2005 Discussion 
Paper (see para. 220). 
While it may be over-prescriptive to say that there can only ever be a 
margin squeeze where there is a duty to deal, it is nonetheless important 
that margin squeeze abuses under Article 82 should at least take account of 
the well-known potential pitfalls of duty to deal cases, in particular the 
trade-off between the possible benefits of increases in competition resulting 
from imposing an obligation to supply and the possible long-run adverse 
                                                     
71   Case C-52/09 Konkurrensverket v TeliaSonera AB (pending). 
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effects on incentives to invest and innovate. In considering this trade-off, it 
is appropriate to consider a) the extent to which adding more competitors 
will increase competition (there could be an immaterial increase in 
competition if two or more firms simply share the previous monopoly 
profits); and b) the scope for meaningful added-value competition on the 
downstream market.  
 
Recommendation 
• While, subject to the views of the Community Courts, it may be too 
prescriptive to say that there can only be a margin squeeze where 
there is a legal duty to deal. Margin squeeze cases should take 
account of the well-known potential pitfalls of duty to deal cases: 
a) adding more competitors does not necessarily improve 
competition, in particular if two or more firms simply share the 
previous monopoly profits; b) there must be scope for meaningful 
added-value competition on the downstream market before a duty to 
deal (or to deal on specific terms) can be imposed; and c) any duty to 
deal should encourage more competition than it discourages.  
 
2.6.3 The need to ensure that wholesale and retail prices are comparable 
A key feature of margin squeeze is that the dominant firm is supplying an 
input to rivals who use it to compete with the dominant firm in one or 
more downstream markets. Because margin squeeze cases always involve 
at least two markets it is important to ensure that like is compared with 
like. The basic theory of margin squeeze relies on the twin assumptions that 
a) there is a simple, linear vertical chain of production, i.e., a single, clearly-
identifiable upstream product and a single, clearly-defined downstream 
product in which the upstream product is a high, fixed proportion of total 
costs, and b) rivals have no opportunity for additional revenues on the 
retail market.  
For example, it may be under a) that rivals use the input in variable 
proportions or can mix and match it with other inputs to some extent. 
Under b), it is often for example the case in telecommunications that rivals 
can use the wholesale input to provide a range of value-added services, 
some of which may not even be offered by the dominant firm in the retail 
market. In Deutsche Telekom, the Commission assessed the margin squeeze 
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solely by reference to Deutsche Telekom’s (and competitors’) access 
charges and excluded revenues from calls. In simple terms, the wholesale 
input had various uses at a retail level for different services so Deutsche 
Telekom argued that it was essential to look at the total retail opportunities 
and revenues, and not just one service.  
While the Court of First Instance rejected the specific argument in 
Deutsche Telekom, it is important that the margin squeeze analysis should 
capture the economic reality of how competitors use access to the 
wholesale input in question. For example, telecommunication service 
providers generally compete on bundles of access and individual call 
services, which is why many national authorities also include other 
revenue in a local loop margin squeeze analysis.  
It may also be that the wholesale input supplied by the dominant 
firm is not a relatively high, fixed proportion of downstream operators’ 
overall costs. It could be a small proportion, or be used in variable 
proportions by downstream competitors. If so, there would be practical 
problems in inferring that downstream rivals’ apparent lack of profitability 
was caused by the dominant firm’s input pricing and, therefore, harmful to 
conclude that rivals should be subsidised by the dominant firm. Put 
differently, there is always uncertainty in this kind of analysis. If the cost 
share is small, then exclusionary effect likely to be small so it may be more 
appropriate to give some benefit of the doubt to the dominant firm. 
In other words, while the Guidance paper is clearly right to say that 
an as-efficient competitor test based on the dominant firm’s costs is a 
necessary requirement for an abusive margin squeeze, the question arises as 
to whether an as-efficient test is sufficient in a margin squeeze context. 
Because of the existence of two markets and the use of the dominant firm’s 
product as a (mere) input, the intuition behind the as-efficient competitor 
test – that it is a sound proxy for those of efficient rivals – may be incorrect 
in many cases. It only tests whether a firm with identical costs and 
supplying an identical product would be profitable or not. (This problem 
does not arise in a predatory pricing case in a single market, either at all or 
to the same extent.)  
It is also important in margin squeeze cases to verify what is causing 
rivals to be unprofitable (if that is indeed the case). There may be non-
TREATMENT OF EXCLUSIONARY ABUSES UNDER ARTICLE 82 | 83 
 
exclusionary explanations. For example, in National Carbonising,72 the 
Commission ultimately concluded that there was no margin squeeze, since 
for both companies, industrial coke was profitable and domestic coke was 
not (due to competition from gas and electricity). In periods of reduced 
industrial activity, neither company could shut down their coke plants (a 
coke plant cannot be shut down), but the dominant company sold a higher 
proportion of industrial coke than the complainant, because it had more 
long-term industrial-coke supply contracts. Thus, lack of profitability was 
not caused by the dominant firm: it was simply a function of the inherent 
(objective) characteristics of the downstream market.  
Some argue that the above-mentioned problems require, in a margin 
squeeze case, proof of pricing not only below the dominant firm’s costs but 
also below rivals’ actual costs. However, this has been rejected by the Court 
of First Instance in Deutsche Telekom (para. 192), for the sound practical 
reason that the dominant firm cannot and should not know its rivals’ costs. 
But this finding does not preclude a competition authority from at least 
making a cross-check to see whether, based on their own actual costs, rivals 
are actually or likely foreclosed. (The competition authority can of course 
ask rivals for the information.) In a marginal case, the dominant firm 
should probably receive the benefit of the doubt if rivals are profitable.  
At the very least, it is imperative that the Commission should check 
in a serious and forensic way for anti-competitive effects in margin squeeze 
cases. Merely failing the as-efficient competitor test cannot be sufficient. 
This should be uncontroversial given the Commission’s overall insistence 
now on evidence of anti-competitive effects. 
 
 
Recommendations 
• A finding of margin squeeze should always require evidence of 
actual or likely anti-competitive effects, i.e. harm to consumer welfare 
in the sense defined in this Report.  
                                                     
72  See National Coal Board, National Smokeless Fuels Limited and the National 
Carbonising Company Limited, OJ 1976 L 35/6. 
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• It is always important to verify whether any lack of profitability by 
the dominant firm’s rivals is caused by factors not attributable the 
dominant firm.  
• There should be no finding of margin squeeze when: i) the dominant 
firm‘s wholesale input costs are a small part of rivals’ overall costs; ii) 
the dominant firm‘s wholesale input is used in variable proportions 
by rivals; or iii) rivals use the input to provide a range of services 
(whether or not the dominant firm itself also offers competing 
services). 
2.7 Margin squeezes in new markets 
Margin squeezes in new and dynamic markets raise great difficulties for 
competition authorities and courts. On the one hand, it may be difficult and 
unsound to draw conclusions from the analysis of costs and revenues in a 
market in an unsteady state. So there is a risk of finding abuses where there 
are none or deeming conduct lawful where it is abusive. There are risks in 
both directions. If efficient rivals’ operations are kept unprofitable due to a 
margin squeeze at the stage of development of the market, there is a risk 
that the rivals would either exit or remain as marginalised players, 
allowing the dominant firm to reap excess profits in a rapidly growing 
market. Markets with network effects may also ‘tip’ irreversibly in favour 
of a dominant firm. 
These problems raise significant difficulties for competition 
authorities and it is important to realise that there is no single, right answer 
as to what should be done with them. The main points to note are the 
following: 
a) Relying solely on historic costs or book accounts is likely to be wrong 
in the case of new markets. There may be sunk costs or other 
investments that take time to recoup. Requiring profits for each sub-
period (e.g. monthly) may be unrealistic in these circumstances. 
Historic costs are more suitable for mature markets. 
b) A pragmatic answer to the problem of markets in unsteady state is to 
exclude all or part of the start-up period from the calculation of costs 
and to only count from when the market becomes more stable (see 
Case COMP/38.233 Wanadoo Interactive, para. 71). 
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c) Another option would be to say that even if the dominant firm is 
technically losing money in the start-up phase, it is loss minimising 
and so is not engaging in an abusive margin squeeze. But the 
dominant firm cannot be given carte blanche in this regard. If in fact it 
is reducing prices more than necessary to minimise losses, or if it is 
likely that the business assumptions underpinning its loss-
minimisation strategy are hopelessly optimistic, then it is incumbent 
on it to take remedial action at the earliest opportunity. However, 
footnote 43 of the Guidance paper sets the bar too high in this regard. 
It states that, while “...undertakings should not be penalised for 
incurring ex post losses where the ex ante decision to engage in the 
conduct was taken in good faith, that is to say, if they can provide 
conclusive evidence.” This is poor wording because the “conclusive 
evidence” in this scenario is that the dominant firm lost money. A 
better formulation – which seems consistent with what the 
Commission presumably intended – is that the dominant firm had “a 
business case is based on unjustified and implausible assumptions or 
where there has been a failure by the undertaking to take remedial 
action once it became apparent that it would not meet the targets.”73  
d) Another solution is to depreciate initial losses over time on the basis, 
for example, that they are long-term investments in customer 
acquisition. In Wanadoo, this was the Commission’s preferred 
approach and, on the facts, it opted for a depreciation period of four 
years. The downside is this approach is that depreciation policies are 
essentially questions of judgment, for which there is no single 
objectively correct answer (much depends on the purpose). 
e) There are also standard techniques used to measure cash flow over 
time in the context of investment-making decisions. The most 
commonly-used method is discounted cash flow (DCF), based on 
whether the net present value (NPV) of the project is positive or not. 
A potentially significant problem with this approach is that a positive 
NPV may include positive margins that result from the exclusion of 
competitors, i.e., it can build in the reward for anti-competitive 
behaviour.  
                                                     
73  See Guidelines on the application of the Competition Act 1998 in the 
telecommunications sector, OFT 417, para. 7.23.  
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Recommendations 
Start-up phases in markets raise significant complexities in margin squeeze 
cases. The mere fact of the dominant firm’s having losses or its failure to 
pass an as-efficient competitor test should not be sufficient in itself for a 
finding of abuse. The Commission should consider the following 
techniques in such cases, which may be applied cumulatively in many 
cases: 
• Relying on historic costs only will generally be inappropriate. 
• It may make sense to exclude a short start-up phase from the analysis 
entirely. 
• Loss minimisation is an acceptable strategy for a dominant firm in a 
start-up phase. However, the dominant firm must be held to strict 
standards in this regard. A business case that is based on unjustified 
and implausible assumptions is unacceptable.  
 
2.7.1 Margin squeeze in (partly) regulated markets 
A striking feature of the two major Commission decisions on margin 
squeeze (Deutsche Telekom, Telefonica) is that they both concerned markets 
where the prices in question were subject to ex ante regulation under the 
various EU telecommunications directives.  
Whether intended or not, Deutsche Telekom has given rise to a good 
degree of confusion on the application of Article 82 EC in regulated 
markets. In that case, the national regulatory authority (NRA) had 
subjected retail prices to a maximum price cap according to baskets of 
services. Moreover, the NRA examined the issue of margin squeeze in at 
least five separate decisions, and concluded that rivals could remain 
competitive by selling access at a low price and recouping additional 
amounts through call charges.  
Deutsche Telekom, not surprisingly, argued that its prices were set by 
the NRA so any margin squeeze that resulted should be attributed to the 
German state and pursued through infringement actions under Article 226 . 
This argument was rejected by the Court of First Instance. First, it held that 
there was only a maximum price cap so the retail prices could be adjusted 
if necessary by Deutsche Telekom. Second, the court held either the NRA 
did not apply Article 82 or did not do so properly (para. 119).  
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But this pays insufficient attention to the duties on NRAs not to 
approve or even encourage measures that are contrary to Article 82 EC.74 It 
also places regulated/dominant firms in a quandary because they will need 
to comply with any non-competition objectives sought by the NRA under 
ex ante regulation while also ensuring at the same time that the primacy of 
ex post competition law objectives is also respected. This is the case even 
where the NRA sets the wholesale price, regulates the maximum retail 
price, and has specifically looked at the price spread between the two on 
several occasions and concluded that they raised no material issues. Given 
the high fine imposed on Telefonica in 2007 for a margin squeeze abuse 
(€152 million), the costs to regulated companies of getting this wrong and 
being forced to second-guess the NRA are obviously enormous. This is 
unfair. 
Recommendations 
The Commission should reiterate the following points:  
• The fundamental principle that NRAs should not approve or 
encourage measures that are contrary to Article 82 EC (or create 
unjustified monopolies and/or situations in which a firm cannot 
easily avoid abusing its dominant position under Article 86 EC). 
• That, in general, if a NRA misapplies Community law, the remedy is 
an infringement action against the Member State, not a competition 
investigation by the Commission. 
• That, while regulation and competition law in principle co-exist, the 
Commission should in general only intervene in cases where there is 
parallel ex ante regulation where: i) the regulatory legislation lacks 
the requisite legal basis or enforcement powers to take effective 
action; ii) where there is a ‘lazy’ or ‘captured’ regulator unwilling or 
unable to apply its own rules. 
                                                     
74  Case 66/86, Ahmed Saeed [1989] ECR 803. The Court held that the German 
regulatory legislation did not preclude the NRA from authorising charges that 
were contrary to Article 82 EC (para. 123). This may have been literally true, but 
it cannot be denied that Articles 10 EC and 82 EC together create such an 
obligation on national authorities and courts, irrespective of what the legislation 
says or does not say. See, e.g., Case C-81/05 Case C-81/05 Anacleto Cordero Alonso 
v Fondo de Garantía Salarial (Fogasa) [2006] ECR I-7569, para. 46. 
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• That, in general, in cases where there is parallel ex ante regulation by 
NRAs, it is better to allow the NRAs to implement any remedies since 
they will be closer to the facts and be better able to do detailed 
monitoring. 
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3. DISCRIMINATION: UNANSWERED 
QUESTIONS 
he Commission needs to ensure that its views on Article 82(c) and 
the Guidance paper are consistent. It would be undesirable to have 
different rules for different kinds of abuse. One basic question about 
discrimination remains without authoritative answers in the existing case 
law: Is harm to consumers necessary for discrimination to be illegal? 
Surprisingly, the answer is not clear from the case law, but as a matter of 
policy and to ensure that the legal rules on discrimination are consistent, 
harm to consumers must be considered necessary in all cases of abuse.75 
The Guidance paper discusses only exclusionary abuses, and not 
discrimination, (or exploitation or reprisals). But discrimination and 
exclusionary abuses cannot be kept separate, so the omission of 
discrimination is serious. A paper that discusses foreclosure without 
mentioning discrimination is incomplete. 
Para. 20, fourth indent, is particularly worrying. That indent begins: 
The position of the customers or input suppliers: This may 
include consideration of the possible selectivity of the conduct 
in question. The dominant undertaking may apply the practice 
only to selected customers or input suppliers who may be of 
particular importance for the entry or expansion of competitors, 
thereby enhancing the likelihood of anti-competitive 
foreclosure. 
                                                     
75  O’Donoghue & Padilla, op. cit.,  pp. 191-194 and ch. 11; and John Temple Lang, 
“Anti-competitive non-pricing abuses under European and national antitrust 
law”, in Barry Hawk (ed.), 2003 Fordham Corporate Law Institute , 2004, pp. 235-
340 at 245, 250-253. 
T 
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This seems clearly to mean that pro-competitive matching of 
competitors’ prices, even above LRAIC, might be illegal because it is 
‘selective’, even if no harm to consumers results. The same objection can be 
made against what the Commission says about ‘individualised’ rebates 
(para. 45). Presumably the Commission does not intend this, and this 
passage should be clarified. 
The Guidance paper should say that in most cases price rebates and 
other differential prices that are permitted as non-exclusionary are also 
legal under Article 82(c). It should also say that if a rebate is equally 
available to all buyers, the fact that only some will qualify for it does not 
make it illegal.76 In general, different treatment that is neither exploitative 
nor exclusionary is legal (unless it is a reprisal). 
The Commission should make it clear that even though the price 
level may sometimes be determined by marginal buyers, it is legal to price-
discriminate between marginal and infra-marginal buyers, and so deprive 
the latter of some of the benefit of competition. 
 
Recommendations 
• A section on discrimination should be added in the next revision of 
the Guidance paper to ensure that the Commission’s views on Article 
82(c) and those contained in the Guidance paper are consistent. 
• In that section, the Commission should state that in most cases price 
rebates and other differential prices that are permitted as non-
exclusionary are also legal under Article 82(c). It should also say that 
if a rebate is equally available to all buyers, the fact that only some 
will qualify for it does not make it illegal. In general, different 
treatment that is neither exploitative nor exclusionary is legal (unless 
it is a reprisal). 
• The Commission should also make it clear that even though the price 
level may sometimes be determined by marginal buyers, it is legal to 
price-discriminate between marginal and infra-marginal buyers, and 
so deprive the latter of some of the benefit of competition. 
                                                     
76  See however the Portuguese airport charges case [2001] ECR I-2613. 
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